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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled.
1
 The function of corporate governance is to ensure that the directors 
discharge their duties effectively, responsibly, with fairness and transparency and 
to make sure that they are accountable for their acts.
2
 
 
Theories underlying the development of corporate governance and the area it 
covers are not new concepts as this date back to the 19
th
 century.
3
 However, 
corporate governance attracted more attention in the last few decades due to 
various crises such as the East Asian crisis of the late 1990’s and various other 
fraudulent activities in the corporate world.
4
 Another example is the fraud case 
which resulted in 25 years in jail for the former WorldCom boss Bernard Ebbers 
for his part in the fraud which caused $11billion collapse of the company,
5
 and 
reports of overly-exuberant compensation arrangements at United State (US) 
insurance company Fannie Mae, in which large rewards were provided to 
company executives despite the company failure and sub-standard company 
performance.
6
 
 
                                                          
1
 Cadbury A Codes of best practice: Report from the Committee on Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance. (1992).The term corporate governance and its importance are dealt with 
in chapter two. 
2
Cassim FHI et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 473. 
3
Mongalo T ‘The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in 
South Africa’ (2003)120 SALJ 179. 
4
 Kregel J ‘Why don’t the bailouts work? Design of a new financial system versus a return to 
normalcy’ (2009)33. Cambridge Journal of Economics 653 available at 
http://cje.oxfordjournals.org  (accessed 27 August 2012). 
5
McConvill JA ‘Positive Corporate Governance’ (2005) 16 Germany Law Journal 1778 available 
at http://ssrn.com/absract=835185 (accessed 27 August 2012). 
6
 Bebchuk L & Fried J ‘Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A Case Study of Perverse 
Incentives, Non-Performance Pay, and Camouflage’ (2005) 30 Journal of Corporate Law 810. 
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The collapse of many companies in the last decade was as a result of much power 
that was vested in directors without checks and balances from other company 
stakeholders. Directors were executing their duties without any control and the 
board was unable to restrict them because of the poor corporate governance 
which empowered a director who is also a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to be 
the chairman of the Board.
7
 
 
The recent collapse of big companies as a result of poor corporate governance has 
raised the concern of investors who finance the firms.
8
 The investors are 
becoming conscious about their investment capital and the trend of the corporate 
business making it more difficult for direct control of company business by the 
shareholders. This was facilitated by globalization which has increased the 
volume as well as the complexity of company business making the external 
control more difficult and thus corporate governance is inevitable in the modern 
world.
9
 
 
The modern corporate governance is different from those experienced in the mid-
nineteenth century because of changes in modern corporate governance principles 
such as the requirement to have executive and non-executive directors, the 
establishment of remuneration committees which determine the directors’ 
remuneration and so many other issues.
10
 Modern corporate governance is more 
diversified than the traditional one. Whilst under the traditional corporate 
governance the main objective was to pursue the interests of the shareholders in 
the modern era the company in order to achieve long term profit; should also look 
                                                          
7
 Coyle B Corporate Governance (2003) 8-10. 
8
 Naidoo R Corporate Governance: An essential for South African Companies (2009) 7 &35. The 
collapses of big company such as LeisureNet in South Africa in 2002 raise a big concern to the 
credit providers and investors. During the inquiry the Delloite &Touche partner Lester Cotten told 
the inquiry commission that no bank or credit committee would have relied on the company’s 
financial statement to determine whether the company had financial commitment. 
9
 Mongalo T (2003)179. 
10
 Mongalo T (2003) 179. 
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at the interest of other stakeholders like employees, consumers and the 
community at large.
11
  
 
The global development of corporate business in the 20
th
 century where there is a 
separation between ownership and control of the company, made the requirement 
of reviewing corporate governance inevitable. For example there exists a 
possibility of the shareholders from one country owning shares in a company 
listed in another country or continent and therefore focus has been shifted on how 
to govern the business in such circumstances.  
 
The developed economies have been reviewing their corporate governance laws 
to make sure that they are in a position to control the corporate business in order 
to attract more capital from investors.
12
 The developing economies need investors 
to invest in their capital markets. Corporate governance has a great impact on the 
efficiency of stock markets as the investors predict the future performance of a 
company by looking on the stability of stock prices. The former US Securities 
Exchange Commissioner once said: 
‘[I]t serves us well to remember that no market has a divine right to investors’ capital…if 
a country does not  have a reputation for strong corporate…practices capital flow 
elsewhere…All enterprises in that country regardless of how steady a particular 
company’s practices may suffer the consequences. Markets must now honour what they 
perhaps, too often, have failed to recognize. Markets exist by the grace of investors. And 
it is today more empowered investors who will determine which companies and which 
markets will stand the test of time and endure the weight of greater competition.’13 
 
Corporate governance thus requires a legal and regulatory framework which is 
robust in order to attract investors to invest their capital in a company or 
organization. This development of corporation and the complexity of markets 
make the requirement of good corporate governance inevitable in the modern 
                                                          
11
 King III emphasised and focused on the sustainability of the company. It recommended that the 
company when doing its primary obligation of making profit should also make sure that the 
company business is sustainable by considering other stakeholders and environment. 
12
 The development of various codes of corporate governance such as the United Kingdom (UK) 
Combined Code, the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the South African King Report and many others. 
13
 Quoted in Naidoo R (2002) 4. 
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corporate business. There is evidence that countries with good corporate legal 
rules are more developed in capital markets and enjoy the flow of investors funds 
compared to those with poor corporate regimes. For example La Porta et al
14
 
presented data that illustrate the vast differences across countries in legal rules 
aimed at investor protection and the quality of the enforcement of these rules. In 
countries with strong legal protections, capital markets are larger since, as La 
Porta et al argue, potential investors are protected against expropriation by 
insiders.
15
 These differences of protection of investors are reflected in both the 
legal rules and the quality of their enforcement.  
 
The preamble to the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance provides that: ‘If countries are to 
reap the full benefits of the global capital market, and if they are to attract long-
term ‘patient’ capital, corporate governance arrangements must be credible and 
well understood across borders’.16 This means that the ability of countries to 
attract foreign capital is affected by their systems of corporate governance and 
the degree to which corporate management is compelled to respect the legal 
rights of lenders, bondholders, and non-controlling shareholders. 
 
The foregoing makes it imperative to analyse and evaluate the extent to which the 
Tanzanian legal and regulatory framework has provided for corporate governance 
issues. Despite the presence of such a regulatory framework, there remain some 
inherent grey areas which cause the low level of flow of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), small number of listed securities and small number of local 
and foreign investors
17
 in the country despite an abundance in natural resources 
and investment opportunities. 
                                                          
14
 La Porta R et al ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 1113.  
15
 La Porta R et al  (1997) 1131.  
16
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, (OECD, April 1999) available at 
http://www.oecd.ord/database/32/18/31557724/ (accessed 20 June 2009). See also Ruda-Sabater 
EJ. ‘Corporate Governance and the Bargaining Power of Developing Countries to Attract Foreign 
Investment’ (2000) 8 Corporate Governance 117-124.  
17
Compared with other countries in SADC and EAC region like South Africa and Kenya 
respectively Tanzania’s capital markets are still small whereby there are only seventeen 
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1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Good corporate governance attracts investor’s capital flow and influences the 
growth of any country’s economy. Despite the existence of many underdeveloped 
resources in the country and established corporate governance laws and 
regulations,
18
 Tanzania is still experiencing relatively low flow of FDI and small 
securities market compared to Kenya and South Africa which are fellow 
members of the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) respectively.
19
 The Dar es Salaam Stock 
Exchange (DSE) like other developing countries’ stock exchanges was formed 
during the privatisation process and there were no comprehensive and pro-active 
strategies to deal with post privatisation investment contributing to 
underdevelopment and stagnation of DSE to date.
20
 There are only seventeen 
companies listed on the DSE and among them are parastatal companies listed for 
privatisation. Currently, there are sixty two companies listed on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange (NSE)
21
 but only three companies are cross listed with DSE.
22
 In the 
meantime, there is no company cross-listed between DSE and the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE)
23
 whereas there are some companies listed on the JSE 
which have cross listed with countries like Namibia and Mauritius which are 
members of SADC.
24
  
                                                                                                                                                             
companies listed in Dar es Salaam Stock Market (DSE). South Africa’s securities markets are 
developed whereby in Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) there are companies cross listed with 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) and with SADC countries like Namibia, Botswana and Mauritius 
stock exchanges. In case of Kenya it is the leading economy in Eastern Africa and its capital 
markets were developed back during the British colonialism. 
18
 Companies Act No. 12 OF 2002, and Capital Markets and Securities Act of 1994 and other 
regulations. 
19
 The two regional blocs have concluded free trade area among their member states which could 
be an opportunity of flow of foreign investment in Tanzania. The free trade area encourages cross 
border business as well as cross border investment.  
20
 Olweny1TO&Kimani D ‘Stock Market Performance and Economic Growth: Empirical 
Evidence from Kenya using Causality Test Approach’ (2011) Advances in Management & 
Applied Economics 180, they concluded that most of stock markets especially those in the 
developing countries face constraints which result in serious implications such as illiquidity, 
absence of activities and absence of well developed investor base. 
21
 This information was retrieved from http://www.cma.ke.org(accessed 4 October 2012). 
22
 DSE Blue Print available at http://www.dse.ac.zaz (accessed 4 October 2012) 
23
 DSE Blue Print (available at http://www.dse.ac.za (accessed 4
 
October 2012). 
24
 This information was retrieved from http://ww.jse.co.za/How-to-list/Main-Board/Dual-listed-
companies.aspx (accessed 27 October 2012). There are companies like Anglo Gold Ashanti Ltd 
which has got mining projects in Tanzania and is among the big mining companies in Tanzania 
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The main regulatory framework for corporate governance in Tanzania is provided 
under the 1992 Public Corporations Act, the 1994 Capital Markets and Securities 
Act, and the 2002 Companies Act, which came into force on 1
st
 March 2006. The 
Capital Markets and Securities Act states that the guidelines on corporate 
governance practices by public listed companies have been developed. Despite 
established corporate governance bodies and the Capital Markets and Security 
Act in Tanzania there is still a low flow of FDI and a generally underdeveloped 
securities market. For instance, the 2009 Doing Business Report of the World 
Bank recorded that Tanzania was below the OECD average.
25
  
 
It seems therefore that there is a gap in the legal and regulatory framework of 
corporate governance in Tanzania which needs to be identified and revised in 
order to cope with current regional and international market competition. 
Therefore, this work intends to investigate those gaps on the legal and regulatory 
framework of corporate governance. 
 
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH  
 
The main objective of this study is to review the legal and regulatory framework 
of corporate governance in Tanzania with the focus on corporate governance laws 
and regulations.  The study is intended to discuss the main legal and regulatory 
framework in Tanzania which plays a part in the corporate governance. The 
Companies Act No. 12 of 2002 will be reviewed in order to establish which 
corporate governance principles are provided and to what extent they are 
effective. 
 
The capital markets and securities laws, guidelines on corporate governance in 
Tanzania with a focus on the listing requirements and other regulations applied at 
                                                                                                                                                             
but its shares are not listed in DSE while they are listed as primary and secondary securities in the 
JSE and Namibian Stock Exchange respectively. 
25
 The World Bank & the International Finance Corporation (IFC) ‘Doing business in Tanzania 
(2009) available at http://www.doingbusiness.org (accessed 4 April 2013). 
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the DSE will also be reviewed in order to establish their effectiveness in 
attracting investors to the market. 
 
Given the comparative value of South Africa and Kenya in SADC and EAC 
respectively, this work will also discuss the legal and regulatory framework of 
corporate governance in Kenya and South Africa and compare with those in 
Tanzania in areas such as shareholders rights; stakeholder’s right; board control 
and effectiveness and the effectiveness of compliance. Such comparative analysis 
is done in order to single out areas of focus in legal and regulatory framework in 
corporate governance law such as companies’ law and stock market and security 
laws in Tanzania. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The following shall be used as research questions in exploring relevant 
information to meet the objectives of the study. 
i. How and why should the Tanzanian legal and regulatory framework 
address corporate governance issues? 
ii. Is the Companies Act of 2002 clear or unclear in addressing corporate 
governance matters? 
iii. Are the Capital Markets and Securities Act of 1994, DSE listing 
requirements and regulations clearly addressing the issues pertaining to 
corporate governance?  
iv. Can the South Africa and Kenyan regimes on corporate governance be of 
assistance in reviewing the Tanzania corporate governance laws? 
v. What kind of legal machinery should be adopted for proper, sufficient and 
expeditious restructuring of corporate governance in Tanzania? 
 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The study will point out and analyse the weakness and gaps in company law, 
securities law and other laws on corporate governance in Tanzania. Such analysis 
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will help to scope out areas which require improvement and hence help to foster 
flow of FDI as well as develop the securities market. 
 
The study will also examine the legal and regulatory framework for stock 
markets which was established for the purpose of privatisation and suggest 
corrective measures in facilitating the development of stock markets in Tanzania. 
 
Besides, this work will make a comparison between corporate regimes in 
Tanzania with those in South Africa and Kenya which are relatively more 
developed. Such comparative analysis will single out areas of focus in legal and 
regulatory framework in corporate governance law such as companies’ law and 
stock markets review in Tanzania. The implementation of research findings is 
expected to give incentives to foreign investors through transfer of new 
technologies, managerial skills, and stimulation in the establishment of micro, 
small and medium enterprises, hence facilitate economic growth of the country. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The research is of the qualitative type which involves study of books, 
electronic/internet sources, journal articles, theses and dissertations, decided 
cases and legislation. The study is principally scrutinising and evaluating the 
literature relevant to legal and regulatory framework of corporate governance in 
Tanzania. The analysis is done from the perspective of corporate governance by 
looking at how corporate laws and regulation play a role in corporate governance.  
The comparative study is also made with Kenya and South Africa by scrutinising 
their legal framework on corporate governance. The two countries are members 
of SADC and EAC respectively and Tanzania is a member of both regional 
economic communities. Therefore the comparative study is important in assisting 
to review the Tanzanian corporate governance laws taking into account their level 
of development in the region and their relationship with Tanzania. 
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1.6 THE FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH PAPER 
 
The dissertation is organised into chapters as outlined below: 
In Chapter 2, the general overview of corporate governance is discussed, the 
definition of the term corporate governance, importance of corporate governance 
and the development of corporate governance code are discussed.  
In chapter 3 the analysis and evaluation of Tanzanian corporate governance 
regime is discussed. The evolution of corporate governance in Tanzania since 
independence to date is discussed. Corporate governance of the state owned 
corporations which was a major corporate structure until 1990s when 
privatisation took place is discussed in this chapter. The current corporate regime 
is also discussed where by the laws and regulation underlying corporate 
governance such as the Companies Act 2002, Capital Markets and Securities Act 
1994 and guidelines for corporate governance are also discussed. The 
effectiveness of corporate governance regulations in Tanzania also forms part of 
this chapter. 
 
In chapter 4, given the relationship existing between Tanzania and South Africa 
and Kenya in the region the comparison of the two countries legal system in 
corporate governance with that of Tanzania is undertaken. The main reason is to 
establish the Tanzanian legal and regulatory frameworks on corporate governance 
and its effectiveness compared with developed economies in Africa like South 
Africa, and Kenya as the leading economy in East Africa.  
In Chapter 5, findings of the research, conclusion, recommendations and matters 
for further research are presented. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The need for good corporate governance in today’s world is inevitable26 due to 
the globalisation of economies, financial and investment markets which lead to 
the increasing convergence of originally separate initiatives in corporate 
governance.
27
 During the current globalisation era, the traditional corporate 
governance laws and regulations are becoming increasingly challenged by 
circumstances and events which have an international impact.
28
 The institutional 
investors for instance do insist on high standards of corporate governance in all 
companies before investment.
29
 
 
Public attention through high profile corporate scandals and collapses has forced 
governments, regulators and boards of corporations to carefully reconsider 
fundamental issues of corporate governance as essential for public economic 
interest.
30
 
Experiences of public sector reform and privatisation in many countries have set 
demands on state owned enterprises and government agencies to address 
                                                          
26
 See Commonwealth Countries Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) guidelines 
(1999)1. 
27
 Coffee JC ‘Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, the Evidence, and the Enduring Tension 
Between “Lumpers” and “Splitters” (2010)5 ECGI Working Paper Series in Law No.144/2010 
electronic copy available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1532922 (accessed 7
 
February 2012). 
28
 Keasey K, Thomson S &Wright M ‘Introduction: the Corporate Governance Problem 
Competing Diagnoses and Solution’ in Keasey K et al (eds) Corporate Governance (1997) 7-12. 
29
 Keasey K, Thomson S &Wright M (1997) 7-12. 
30
 For instance the enactment of Sarbanes Oxley legislation in the United States which introduced 
many new requirements in the New York Stock Exchange listing rules after the collapse of Enron 
&WorldCom. Major developments in corporate governance such as corporate codes were effected 
during the past two decades. 
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standards of integrity expected of the public service.
31
 Another development in 
corporate governance is the rise of “ethical investors” requiring corporations to 
act in socially responsible manner in the communities in which they are operating 
in the areas of environment, health and safety, ethnic and community relations for 
their continued existence.
32
 
 
The fact is that good corporate governance practices are now becoming a 
necessity for every country and business enterprise, and are no longer restricted 
to the activities of public-listed corporations in advanced industrial economies; 
the developing countries should also adopt them in order to attract more investors 
from developed economies. 
 
This chapter will examine the theoretical framework of corporate governance, 
definition of the term corporate governance from various authors and the 
importance of corporate governance. 
 
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
The English word theory was derived from a technical term in philosophy in 
ancient Greek. As an everyday word, theoria, meant ‘a looking at, viewing, 
beholding’, but in more technical contexts it came to refer to contemplative or 
speculative understandings of natural things, such as those of natural 
philosophers, as opposed to more practical ways of knowing things, like that of 
skilled orators or artisans.
33
  
                                                          
31
 For example the OECD and CAGC guidelines provides for both principles to be followed by 
public and private companies. The King III Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 
also applies to all companies and organizations. 
32
 See King ME A Report on Corporate Governance (2009) (King III) principle 1.2. 
33
 See Encyclopaedia dictionary available at http://www.en.wikipedia.org/.../Encyclopaedia_ 
where the word ‘theory’ was used in Greek philosophy, for example, that of Plato. It is a 
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The word has been in use in English since the late 16th century.
34
 Modern uses of 
the word ‘theory’ are derived from the original definition, but have taken on new 
shades of meaning, still based on the idea that a theory is a thoughtful and 
rational explanation of the general nature of things. Neuman
35
 defines a theory as 
a system of interconnected ideas that condense and organize knowledge about the 
world.  
 
There are many theoretical perspectives which are used to explain corporate 
governance. The best known theories are: transaction cost theory, agency theory, 
resource dependence theory, managerial hegemony theory, class hegemony 
theory, stakeholder theory and stewardship theory. For the purpose of this study 
only agency and stewardship theories are going to be discussed. The two theories 
have been chosen as they predominantly generate the principles of corporate 
governance that are discussed in the context of Tanzania legal framework for 
corporate governance.
36
 
 
2.2.1 Agency theory 
 
According to Eisenhardt
37
 the agency theory is concerned with analysing and 
resolving problems that occur in the relationship between principals (owners or 
shareholders) and their agents or top management. The theory rests on the 
assumption that the role of organizations is to maximize the wealth of their 
owners or shareholders. It has been pointed out that separation of control from 
ownership implies that professional managers manage a firm on behalf of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
statement of how and why particular facts are related. It is related to words such as ‘spectator’ ‘a 
view’ ‘to see’ literally ‘looking at a show’. 
34
 Harper D ‘Theory’ available at www.onlineetimologydictionary.weakpedia.dictionary (accessed 
14 February 2013). 
35
 Neuman L Social Research Methods-Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (5ed) (2003) 77. 
36
 See Chapters 3 and 4 for detailed discussion. 
37
 Eisenhardt KM ‘Building theories from case study research’ (1989) Academy of Management 
Review 532. 
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firm’s owners.38 Conflicts arise when a firm’s owners perceive the professional 
managers not to be managing the firm in the best interests of the owners.  
 
The agency theory holds that most businesses operate under conditions of 
incomplete information and uncertainty. Such conditions expose businesses to 
two agency problems namely adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse 
selection occurs when a principal cannot ascertain whether an agent accurately 
represents his or her ability to do the work for which he or she is paid. On the 
other hand, moral hazard is a condition under which a principal cannot be sure if 
an agent has put forth maximal effort.
39
  
 
Donaldson and Davis
40
 argue that managers will not act to maximize returns to 
shareholders unless appropriate governance structures are implemented to 
safeguard the interests of shareholders. Therefore, the agency theory advocates 
that the purpose of corporate governance is to minimize the potential for 
managers to act in a manner contrary to the interests of shareholders. The theory 
suggests that a firm’s top management should have a significant ownership of the 
firm in order to secure a positive relationship between corporate governance and 
the amount of stock owned by the top management.
41
  
 
The agency theory presents the relationship between directors and shareholders 
as a contract.
42
 This implies that the actions of directors, acting as agents of 
shareholders, must be checked to ensure that they are in the best interests of the 
shareholders. The proponents of this theory therefore believe that corporate 
governance is a response to the typical agency problem between investors and 
managers. 
 
                                                          
38
 Eisenhardt KM (1989) 533. 
39
 Eisenhardt KM (1989) 535. 
40
 Donaldson L & Davies JH ‘Boards and Company Performance-Research Challenges the 
Conventional Wisdom’ (1994) Corporate Governance: An International Review 151. 
41
 Mallin CA Handbook on International Corporate Governance: Country Analyses (2006) 116. 
42
 Stiles P &Taylor B Boards at Work: How Directors view their Roles and Responsibilities 
(2002) 52. 
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2.2.2 Stewardship theory 
 
The stewardship theory is also known as the stakeholders’ theory. It adopts a 
different approach from the agency theory. It starts from the premise that 
organisations serve a broader social purpose than just maximising the wealth of 
shareholders. Under this theory the stakeholder can be viewed as ‘the end’ as 
well as the ‘means to an end.’43 
 
‘The end’ view of stake holders value means that everyone in a society has to be 
involved in the governance of the corporation. The corporation is viewed as a 
social institution in society. Clarke and Clegg
44
 posit that ‘stake holding 
represents a general sense of social inclusion; an economy or society in which 
every citizen is a valued member, everyone contributes and everyone benefits in 
some way’. This includes the process of corporate accountability which is 
reinforced and legitimised by either financial or material interest in the well-
being of the corporation. 
 
On the other hand stake holders’ value can be viewed as ‘means to an end.’ This 
refers to stakeholders as an instrument to improve corporate performance and 
efficiency. Stakeholders are included in governance of the company on the 
ground that their participation will lead to an effective means to improve 
efficiency, profitability, competition and economic success. This view is 
expressed by Campbell who speculates that ‘I support stakeholder theory not 
from a left-wing reason of equity, but because I believe it to be fundamental to 
understanding how to make money in business.’45  The supporters of this theory 
believe that for its long term survival, corporations should serve multiple 
stakeholder interests rather than shareholder interests alone.
46
  
 
                                                          
43
 Clarke T &Clegg S Changing Paradigms: The Transformation of Management Knowledge for 
the 21st Century (1998) 106-107. 
44
 Clarke T &Clegg S (1998) 107. 
45As quoted in Letza S, Kirkibride J & Sun X ‘Shareholding versus Stake Holding: ‘A Critical 
Review of Corporate Governance’ (2002) Paper presented at Queen’s University Belfast 
International Conference for Corporate Governance: Belfast. 
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 King III Report (2009) para2.3. 
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The stewardship theory holds that corporations are social entities that affect the 
welfare of many stakeholders.
47
 Successful organizations are judged by their 
ability to add value for all of their stakeholders. Participation of stakeholders in 
corporate decision-making can enhance efficiency and reduce conflicts.
48
 A 
firm’s board of directors and its CEO, acting as stewards, are more motivated to 
act in the best interests of the firm rather than for their own selfish interests.
49
 It is 
submitted that the stewardship theory of corporate governance should be adopted 
for the continued existence of the company. 
 
2.3 DEFINITION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Different authors have conferred the term with both broad and narrow content. 
The narrow definition relates corporate governance relationship between the 
board of directors, managers and shareholders.
 50
 The supporters of this view 
associate corporate governance with the need to ensure the interests of the 
shareholder are secured in the firm’s business.51 The pioneers of this view argued 
that when the interests of shareholders are efficiently implemented there will be a 
good chance for lump sum taxes
52
  hence used as a competitive symmetry.  
 
The more broad definition of the term corporate governance encompass the way 
companies are controlled taking into consideration the interests of not only 
shareholders but also other stakeholders and society in general.
53
 The proponents 
                                                          
47
 Donaldson L& Davis JH ‘Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and 
Shareholder Returns’ (1991) Australian Journal of Management 116. 
48
 Turnbull S Corporate governance: Its Scope, Concerns and Theories (1997) as cited in Tricker 
RI (Ed.) History of management thought: Corporate governance (2000) ch 4. 
49
 Clarke T ‘Corporate governance: the State of the Art’ (1993) Managerial Auditing Journal 5. 
50
 Millstein IM ‘The Evolution of Corporate Governance in the United States’ Remarks to the 
World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland (February 2, 1998). 
51
 Allen F ‘Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies’ (2005) Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy164.  
52
 See Allen F ‘Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies’ (2005) Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 165. 
53
 King III Report (2009) principle 1.1. 
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of this view emphasised that corporate governance is concerned with ensuring 
that the firms are run in such a way that society’s resources are used efficiently.54 
This broad view covers the narrow view when the market is perfect and 
complete. In this case, if the firms pursue the interest of the shareholders then the 
allocation of the resources will be efficient. But with flawed markets this broad 
objective can potentially make all stakeholders better than focusing on the 
shareholder’s interests only.55 In the following paragraphs different definitions of 
corporate governance are examined as given by different authors. 
 
The Cadbury Report defines corporate governance ‘as the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled’. 56 The Cadbury Report’s views on 
corporate governance focused on the internal structure of the corporation and the 
decision making body of the company.
57
 It focus on how the board and 
management are controlled for the interest of the company and other 
stakeholders. It incorporates issues such as director’s duties, shareholder 
protection, risk management, financial accounting and reporting.
58
 In most 
countries this narrower definition has been adopted in discussing corporate 
governance.
59
 
 
The OECD Task Force defined corporate governance as: 
‘a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and 
other stakeholders. It also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper 
incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of 
                                                          
54
 See Allen F (2005) 165. 
55
 For instance where there are externalities such as pollution then maximizing the value of the 
firm is well known to cause misallocation of resources. If the firm were to use the broader view 
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56
 See Cadbury Report (1992) para 2.5. 
57
 Salacuse JW ‘Corporate Governance in the New Century’ (2004) The Company Lawyer 72. 
58
 Du Plessis JJ ‘Corporate Governance and the Cadbury Report’ (1994) 6 South African 
Mercantile Law Journal 81-82. 
59
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the company and shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring, thereby 
encouraging firms to use resources more efficiently.’60 
 
From the above definition, corporate governance seeks to ensure that  the rights 
of shareholders are protected, there is  equitable treatment of shareholders, the 
role of stakeholders are considered in corporate business, there is disclosure and 
transparency as well as the board of directors is responsible and accountable.
61
  
 
Gabrielle O‘Donovan defines corporate governance as: 
‘[A]n internal system encompassing policies, processes and people, which serves the 
needs of shareholders and other stakeholders, by directing and controlling management 
activities with good business savvy, objectivity, accountability and integrity. Sound 
corporate governance is reliant on external marketplace commitment and legislation, 
plus a healthy board culture which safeguards policies and processes.’62  
According to O’Donovan corporate governance is concerned with the way the 
company management is controlled in order to achieve the long term strategies of 
the company by considering interests of both shareholders and other stakeholders 
for the sustainability of the corporation. 
 
The postulation which can be derived from the above definition is that corporate 
governance is meant for big public companies whose shares are listed in the stock 
markets. The challenges of economic survival can rebut this assumption because 
implementation of appropriate control measures, managing business risk and 
planning is essential for all type of companies for long term existence.
63
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OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, (OECD, April 1999) available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf (accessed 20 June 2009). 
61
 The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
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A more inclusive definition of corporate governance that has been proffered is 
the one that creates a governance system which considers stakeholders welfare 
together with corporate needs and relationship with all stakeholders. It is 
concerned with creating a balance between economic and social goals; and 
between individual and communal goals. The efficient use of resources, 
accountability and stewardship are likely to align the interests of individuals, 
corporations and society.
64
 It is submitted therefore, the broader definition of 
corporate governance should be adopted because corporations do not operate in 
isolation of other stakeholders. Therefore the interest of all stakeholders has to be 
addressed in conducting a firm’s businesses.  
 
2.4 OVERVIEW OF EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Corporate governance became an issue attracting international concern and 
debate from the early 1980s through to 1990s and continued into the twenty-first 
century. The phenomenon of corporate governance is not new; it has existed 
since the incorporation of enterprises began.
65
 The recent concern and debate on 
corporate governance reflects the recognition of the centrality of major 
enterprises in allocating resources in the economy.
66
 The separation of ownership 
and control of corporations that Berle and Means
67
 highlighted lies at the heart of 
the debate on corporate governance.
68
  
 
Pressure on governance and on business in the corporate sector to improve 
corporate governance arrangement has arisen often in the context of the failure of 
large companies and particularly the corporate scandals taking place since the 
beginning of last two decades. The spectacular collapse of Enron and WorldCom 
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in the US and other companies in other countries had led to pressure and also 
action to change corporate governance practices.
69
 
 
The collapse of a number of large corporations and hostile takeovers particularly 
in the United Kingdom (UK) culminated in the Cadbury Report on the financial 
aspects of corporate governance in 1992.70 Other Reports were the Greenbury 
Report on director remuneration in 1995, and the Hampel Report in 1998 that 
underlines the role of the board in enhancing the prosperity of the corporation.
71
 
 
In 1998 the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports were brought together and updated 
in the form of the Combined Code. In 1999 the Turnbull guidance was issued to 
provide directors with guidance on how to develop an effective system of internal 
control. The Combined Code was updated (in 2003) to incorporate 
recommendations from reports on the role of non-executive directors (the Higgs 
Report) and the role of the audit committee (the Smith Report).
72
 In the same 
year, the UK Government appointed the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to 
assume responsibility for publishing and maintaining the Code. 
 
As a result of the Enron and WorldCom scandals in the US, there were many new 
corporate governance requirements enshrined in legislation. The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act
73
 as well as other regulatory mechanisms for instance the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) rules and the requirements of corporate governance ratings 
agencies were reviewed.
74
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70
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More and more countries have embarked on corporate governance reforms in 
order to protect the interests of investors. The King’s Committee Report and 
Code of Corporate Governance in South Africa were published for the first time 
in 1994. The new Code on Corporate Governance (King III) came into force 
March 2010. It is among the initiatives which stimulate corporate governance in 
Africa.
75
 The  World Bank and the Common Wealth Secretariat  in order to 
raise technical awareness  provides training to various African countries such 
as Botswana, Senegal, Tunisia, Mali, Mauritania, Cameroon, Gambia, 
Mozambique, Mauritius, Sierra Leone and Zambia to help them put in place 
appropriate mechanisms to promote good corporate governance.
76
 In East 
Africa there were regional conferences conducted in order to create awareness 
and promote regional co-operation in matters of corporate governance.
77
  
 
Corporate governance continues to be an area of focus for most companies, 
regardless of whether they are involved in global operations or not.  There are 
many questions and issues that firms still struggle with: What is good corporate 
governance and why is it so important? Why are so many firms and governments 
promoting improved techniques in corporate governance? What are those 
techniques and best practices and is there evidence that these reforms and policies 
are useful for firms in promoting transparency, sustainability and the confidence 
of global markets and investors? 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
composed entirely of independent directors; (iii)must have internal audit function; (iv) must adopt 
and disclose corporate governance guidelines; (v) Each listed company CEO must certify to the 
NYSE each year that he or she is not aware of any violation by the company of NYSE corporate 
governance listing standards, qualifying the certification to the extent necessary. 
75
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76
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The answers to the above issues are important in order to promote good business 
practices, good decision-making and opportunities for investors to ensure the 
reliability of their investment. The importance of good corporate governance is 
therefore elaborated upon in the discussion below so that both companies and 
policy-makers should ensure that good corporate governance is adopted widely 
and is effectively institutionalized throughout the firm.
78
 
 
2.5 IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
2.5.1 Efficient management 
 
The nature of the debate on corporate governance is influenced by the way in 
which corporations are viewed. The early conceptualisations of corporations 
treated them as the property of equity capital providers (shareholders) for the 
pursuance of their economic interests. However, an essential characteristic of a 
corporation is its ability to have a separate existence apart from those who own 
it.
79
  
 
When a corporation has acquired its own separate existence, the issue of control 
arises. Historically,
80
 control of a corporation was exercised by its owners either 
directly or through control of management. However, when ownership and 
management are separated, as when ownership becomes fragmented, control of 
the corporation presents a significant challenge. The issue of the separation of 
management from ownership, which results in the transfer of control of 
corporations from owners to professional managers,
81
 received greater emphasis 
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since early 20
th
 century following the Berle and Means article: The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property
82
 in which they observed that: 
‘…[I]n the modern corporation, these two attributes of ownership (control and economic 
rights) no longer attach to the same individual or group. The stockholder has surrendered 
control over his wealth. He has become a supplier of capital, and a risk taker pure and 
simple, while ultimate responsibility and authority of ownership is attached to the stock 
ownership, the other attribute is attached to corporate control. Must we not, therefore 
recognise that we are no longer dealing with property in the old sense? Does the 
traditional logic of property still apply? Because an owner who also exercises control 
over his wealth is protected in the full receipt of the advantages derived from it, must it 
necessarily follow that an owner who has surrendered control of his wealth should 
likewise be protected to the full?.’ 
The main concern is who should control the corporation, and for the pursuit of 
which goals? As ownership of corporations became dispersed, owner-control 
weakened and corporations came under the implicit control of their managers.
83
  
 
Good corporate governance acts as a bridge for the board and management of the 
corporation in attaining long term strategies for the continued existence of the 
company. Therefore, there is a need for a system which checks their power for 
the endurance of the company.
84
 Professor Robert Tricker once said that ‘whilst 
management processes have been widely explored, relatively little attention has 
been paid to the processes by which companies are governed. If management is 
about running business, governance is about seeing that they are run properly.’85  
 
Good corporate governance will therefore ensure that the board is independent, 
accountable, efficient, transparent, and execute their duties fairly for the interest 
of all stakeholders. In managing the business of the company personal interests of 
                                                          
82
 Berle AA & Means GC ‘The Modern corporation and private property’ (1932) as cited in 
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directors should not prejudice interests of the company. It has been emphasised 
that the independent board is the one where the position of the CEO and 
chairman of the board are not occupied by the same person.
86
  
 
Following the popular fraudulent corporate scandals such as Enron and 
WorldCom, the perception of executives and management has become too 
negative.
87
 This can be evidenced through the initiatives taken in ensuring good 
corporate governance internationally. It is through good corporate governance 
that the integrity of the board and management can be measured and controlled.
88
 
It is worth noting that the Vice-President of Tanzania Dr Mohammed Gharib 
Bilal made the following observation when he was launching the Institute of 
Directors of Tanzania (IoDT). 
‘...[M]any of the problems leading to our economic crises can be linked to poor 
corporate governance, with too many boards failing to meet their primary function of 
closely overseeing management ... most of them ended up by making decisions focusing 
on the short term profit.’
 89
 
 
Research shows that responsible management of environmental, social and 
governance issues creates a business culture and environment that builds both a 
company’s integrity within the society and the trust of its shareholders.90 Hence 
corporate governance has implication for company behaviour not only to the 
shareholders but also to the employees, customers, credit providers, and the 
community in which the business operates. 
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2.5.2 Investors confidence  
 
The collapse of Enron and other corporate scams which culminated in the global 
financial crisis have attracted public concern around the question of corporate 
governance. The main issue has been focused on how to develop systems, rules 
and institutions that will induce corporate executives to manage corporate assets 
in the interests of the shareholders, rather than running it for their own interests. 
 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 also had implications on the investors’ 
confidence in investing their capital in the markets. Many commentators argued 
that the financial crisis was a regulatory failure, but corporate governance played 
a significant role.
91
 It is possible also that due to the recent corporate disasters, 
the investors will be reluctant to invest for fear of their capital being stolen or 
misused by the top management. This may affect the flow of capital in the 
market. 
 
The effect of financial crisis although this happened in the developed economies, 
spread all over the world. The emerging and developing economies also 
experienced it. The financial crisis seemed to create the risk from increase in 
funding costs hence tighter lending conditions that will affect economic activity. 
Furthermore, the dampened investors’ appetite might also affect capital flows to 
the developing economies.
92
 
 
It is apparent that the issue of corporate governance is fundamental in the 
restoration of the confidence of investors in order to guarantee the continued 
existence of corporations. Through corporate governance principles the corporate 
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elites’ powers can be limited for the interest of the shareholders, for the industrial 
system and for society as a whole.
93
 
 
The launching of the IoDT in 2012 is evidence that corporate governance is a 
fundamental for any country’s economy regardless of the level of economic 
development. IoDT has initiated training in Certificate of Directorship (CiDir) 
programme for about 100 directors and senior executives from various 
organizations in Tanzania to ensure that they get better management expertise to 
improve the business environment.  
 
More generally, the ability of countries to attract foreign capital is affected by 
their systems of corporate governance and the degree to which corporate 
management is compelled to respect the legal rights of lenders, bondholders, and 
non-controlling shareowners.
94
 It is worth noting that James D. Wolfensohn, 
former President of the World Bank, stated that ‘the proper governance of 
companies will become as crucial to the world economy as the proper 
governance of countries’.95  
 
The global financial crisis is an example of how the failure of boards and 
executives to understand and manage risks led to governance failures with very 
serious consequences, not only for financial firms and banks, but for individuals 
and national economies around the world.
96
  
 
There is a possibility of investors to refrain from providing capital or demand 
high risk premium for their capital. Therefore countries with effective systems of 
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corporate governance are in a better position of getting investors than those with 
poor corporate governance standards.
97
 It has been urged that because of its role 
in capital formation, corporate governance has important consequences for 
economic efficiency and growth.
98
  
 
For example, Rwanda is the leading country in the EAC region with better 
investor protection measures followed by Burundi, Kenya and Tanzania.
99
 In 
2013, the World Bank has ranked Rwanda 52
nd
 out of 185 countries worldwide 
for having good environment for investments. Generally, Rwanda is currently the 
best performing country in the East African region and is ranked at the 3
rd
 
position as easiest place to do business in sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, 
South Africa is ranked at 2
nd
 in sub-Saharan Africa and is ranked 39
th
 globally. 
Mauritius is ranked as the first in sub-Saharan Africa and 19th globally whereas 
Tanzania is ranked 97th and 127 respectively.
100
 Criteria used by the World Bank 
in evaluating these economies are based on the ease of obtaining construction 
permit, paying taxes, protecting investors and resolving insolvency. 
 
The World Bank used the following criteria in  evaluating to what extent the 
country protect investors: transparency of related-party transactions (extent of 
disclosure index), liability for self-dealing (extent of director liability index) and 
shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct and the 
shareholders’ ability to access corporate information before and during litigation 
(ease of shareholder suits index).
101
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Globally, Mauritius stands at 13 in the ranking of 185 economies on the strength 
of investor protection. While the most recent doing business data reflect how well 
regulations in Mauritius protect minority investors; overtime the data shows that 
it has been the best performer in Sub-Saharan region in protecting minority 
investors.
102
  
 
South Africa has reformed its corporate governance regime in order to attract 
more investors and this country has undertaken major reforms in the past two 
decades in this aspect.  Among them were the establishment of corporate 
governance code (King Reports) whose final version came into force in 2010 
(King III Report), enactment of new Companies Act of 2008 and Securities 
Services Act of 2004. 
 
The new Rwandan Companies Act
103
 requires shareholders’ approval of 
transactions between interested parties. Directors and shareholders with 
conflicting interests cannot participate in the approval process. Furthermore, it 
mandated greater disclosure of such transactions to the board of directors and to a 
general meeting of shareholders. It also required an external review before such 
transactions are approved and detailed disclosure in the annual reports once 
approved. The law established as well a clear regime of liability for directors if 
transactions with interested parties cause damage to the company. 
 
It can be concluded that for any country to remain viable, sustainable and 
competitive in the global market it needs well-governed and managed business 
enterprises that can attract investment, create jobs and wealth hence good 
corporate governance became a prerequisite for attracting investors.  
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2.5.3 Stability of Stock Markets 
 
Deeper and more liquid international financial markets and new instruments have 
served to heighten awareness among policy makers on the need to continually 
update and review microeconomic structures including arrangements regarding 
transparency and disclosure.
104
 In the last few decades the individual equity 
ownership has continued to decrease in terms of the total percentage of equity 
owned. For instance between the 1980’s and the 1990’s the individual ownership 
of equity in UK companies decreased from 54 per cent in 1963 to less than 18 per 
cent in 1993.
105
  
 
The decrease of individual shareholders resulted in the increasing dominance of 
institutional shareholders such as pension funds, insurance funds, and private 
retirement saving schemes and long term life insurance or assurance companies. 
Hence developing economies need institutional investors in order to solve the 
problem of illiquidity. At the same time application of good corporate 
governance is needed to govern those companies because it is difficult for 
institutions to control them. Due to complexity and controlling nature of these 
companies by the institutional shareholders, Cadbury Report noted that: 
‘[B]ecause of their collective stake, we look forward to the institutions in particular, with 
the backing of institutional shareholder’s committee, to use their influence as owners to 
insure that the companies in which they have invested comply with the code.’106 
 
The institutional funds belong to the beneficiaries whose interests are represented 
by fund managers; there are possibilities for managers responsible for investment 
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of those funds to act in their own interest.
107
 In order to solve this problem of 
misappropriation of beneficiaries’ funds those trusted with it should adhere to the 
principles of good corporate governance. 
 
Corporate governance has a great impact on the efficiency of stock markets. For 
example, in the Asian crisis of 1997, it was alleged that poor corporate 
governance influenced the stock markets’ inefficiency to a large extent.108 
Stability of stock prices is one of the important factors for the investors to predict 
the future performance of a company or organisation. It is through good corporate 
governance that listed companies can attract investors and embrace stability of 
the prices. Stock price stability shows the level of risk for investment.
109
 
Investors will only invest if they undertake appropriate risk for their investment. 
Therefore, those organizations which are seeking new funds for businesses must 
guarantee good corporate governance. 
 
Developing countries in order to attract FDI have to improve market confidence 
by laying down rules and regulations to govern operations in the Stock Exchange. 
Developed stock exchanges act as a source of capital for the industry and 
government. Briston observed that: 
‘[I]t is clear that stock exchange developed in order to meet two demands. First, the 
increase of the securities of a long-term or permanent nature required a market for 
purchase and sale of these securities, so that their holder could liquidate their investment 
in a short-term. Also the expansion of the industry during the nineteenth century 
necessitated the discovery of the new sources of finance.’ 110  
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He further opined that ‘one of the main such source was the stock exchange. Thus 
its major functions are the provision of a market for the purchase and sale of the 
securities and the provision of capital for the purpose of industry and 
government, both central and local.’111 
 
Most of the stock exchanges in developing countries were established during the 
privatisation process. The privatisation of state owned enterprises was meant to 
enable the government and industry to raise capital and provide a secondary 
market where existing investors can sell and where prospective investors can 
buy.
112
  
 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) identified a number of goals for the 
privatisation process in the developing countries. It observed that: 
‘[O]ne goal is maximum economic efficiency of the resulting enterprises. A second goal 
may be to raise revenue for the state to address deficits. Another goal in the case of the 
newly open economic system is to permit the people of the nation to participate in the 
ownership. A fourth goal is to establish an active secondary market for securities… .’113 
The above observation reveals the need for efficient governance of the privatised 
enterprises to attain those goals.  
 
Good corporate governance principles such as disclosure should be adhered to 
and must be sufficient and adequate in order to win investors’ confidence. 
Disclosure is the most important aspect in the capital market as it is the only 
information that the market can rely on. At the same time, out-dated laws and 
cumbersome licensing, and complicated entry which impede efficient operation, 
should be discouraged. For instance, the underdeveloped stock market in 
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Tanzania was predominantly caused by inter alia out dated laws and cumbersome 
procedures especially with regard to foreign investors.
114
 
 
It is not only potential investors that are constrained in their investment choices 
when corporations and countries have inadequate corporate governance laws and 
practices, the opportunities for partnerships and mergers and acquisitions are also 
limited. Many companies will be less interested in partnering with firms whose 
corporate governance is inadequate or not properly disclosed since this could 
expose the partnering companies to legal liability in their home jurisdiction if 
something were to go wrong.
115
  
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
From the literature review it can be concluded that corporate governance is 
important in every country in order to ensure careful resource management and 
attraction of investors. Good corporate management can generally contribute to 
the stock market growth and economic growth of the country. Countries with 
good corporate governance are in a position to attract more investors compared to 
those with poor corporate governance practices.
116
 Directors must work in the 
interest of both shareholders and other stakeholders for the endurance of the 
company. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TANZANIA 
 
3.1 EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TANZANIA 
 
Tanzania is a developing country located in the Eastern African region, 
positioned around 5° south of the Equator and 45° east, and covers 945,087 sq 
km. It is bordered to the North and North East by Uganda and Kenya and to the 
North West and West by Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. To the South and Southwest lie Mozambique and Zambia respectively, 
and the Indian Ocean lies to the East. Tanzania is made up of Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar. Tanganyika regained its independence in 1961 from the British, and 
became a republic in 1962. Zanzibar regained its independence from the Arab 
Sultanate in 1964. The two joined to form the current union – called the United 
Republic of Tanzania (URT) - in April 1964. Tanzania was a single party state 
from 1965 to 1991. In 1992 a multiparty political system was re-introduced.
117
 
Tanzania is viewed as having been one of the most politically stable countries in 
Africa since independence. The transition towards a multiparty political system 
has also been peaceful. This stable environment is viewed as providing a base for 
rapid economic growth.
118
  
 
Tanzania, in terms of economic potential, is endowed with a rich natural resource 
base and easy access for international trade. 46% of its land is suitable for 
agriculture (with only 6.7% of it being cultivated), it also has a large hydropower 
potential, a wide range of mineral deposits including gold, diamonds, tin, iron, 
uranium, phosphate, gemstones, and nickel, and also natural gas. Other resources 
include exotic varieties of wildlife and a number of tourist attractions.
119
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 The multiparty political system was re-established following the recommendations of the 
Nyalali Commission despite the fact that this Commission found 77.2% of the people interviewed 
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Despite this potential and rich resource endowment, Tanzania remains one of the 
least developed countries in the world; poverty remains pervasive and deep. 
About half of Tanzanian citizens are poor, 32 per cent illiterate and the infant 
mortality rate stands at 99 per 1000 live births.
120
 This suggests that the resources 
are not sufficiently utilised to bring about social and economic development.  
 
The law governing corporations after independence were common law and the 
Companies Ordinance which originated from the British statute of 1932.
121
 The 
Companies Ordnance operated until 2002 when it was replaced by the new 
Companies Act of 2002 which came into force in 2006. After Arusha Declaration 
the Pubic Corporation Act of 1967 was enacted in order to govern and control the 
state owned corporations which were nationalised. This Act was amended in 
1993 by Public Corporations (Amendment) Act No. 16 and further amended by 
Public Corporations (Amendment) Act No. 17 of 1999.   
 
There is very little literature on corporate governance in Tanzania immediately 
after independence as it took almost seven years before the state nationalised all 
means of production including corporations. After the Arusha Declaration of 
1967 the debate in the context of state ownership of corporations started.  
 
The economy experienced a severe crisis in the 1980s. However, recently, 
changes have been taking place with positive growth being registered. In 
comparative terms, the economy of Tanzania has been showing positive growth 
since the mid-1990s.  
 
Following the government’s agreement with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank in 1986, a market-oriented system of economic 
coordination modelled on the classical/neoclassical perspective was re-
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introduced.
122
 This development reflected the worldwide victory of classical 
liberalism which advocates market coordination of economic activities.
123
  
 
The economic reforms that have been implemented in Tanzania have combined 
both liberalisation and privatisation initiatives. Liberalisation generally refers to a 
reduction in government control in order to open up the economy to competitive 
pressures.
124
 In line with the IMF/World Bank conditions, state withdrawal from 
direct involvement in business activities is being achieved through the divestiture 
of state owned corporations.
125
 A Presidential Commission on parastatal sector 
reform (PSRC) was established in 1993. Privatisation, which has been the major 
approach to divesting state-owned corporations, refers to the ownership and 
control of assets once owned by the state by various private shareholders and 
corporations.
126
  
 
The arguments for privatisation include the improvement in efficiency of 
allocating of resources, since this is encouraged by the market. This will, in turn, 
lead to an increased contribution to the government’s finances through taxation. 
Broadening the ownership of corporations has also been cited as a motivating 
factor for privatisation.
 127
 
 
The privatisation initiatives of the 1990s and beyond reversed the nationalisation 
policies of the 1960s and 1970s. In a similar way, the leadership code introduced 
by the Arusha Declaration was reversed in 1991 through what has come to be 
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called the Zanzibar Declaration.
128
 The adoption of the Zanzibar Declaration is 
viewed as a move to realise individual rights in a liberal economy, including the 
right to own property. This resolution is mainly relevant to senior civil servants 
since it allows them to now own rentable property, shares in privately-owned 
companies and accept directorship appointments in privately-owned companies. 
 
The economic reforms in Tanzania include attempts to evolve local sources of 
capital for firms, to replace the government which prior to these reforms provided 
capital for state-owned enterprises. In this respect, the Capital Markets and 
Securities Authority (CMSA) was established in 1994 to regulate securities 
business in Tanzania, promote a securities market and establish the stock 
exchange. The DSE was established in 1996 and began operations in 1997.  
 
3.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE STATE OWNED 
CORPORATIONS 
 
The state owned corporation was the dominant form of corporation during the 
socialism era in Tanzania. Socialism philosophy of ‘Ujamaa na kujitegemea’ 
paved the way for the nationalization of major means of production and put them 
under the control of the government.
129
 The way in which the state owned 
corporations were governed is stated in the Public Corporations Act of 1969 and 
in different individual Acts which established that corporation.
130
 The Public 
Corporation Act of 1969 was amended in 1976 and applied until 1992 when the 
current Public Corporation Act was enacted.  
 
                                                          
128
 Tripp AM Changing the Rules: The politics of Liberalisation and the Urban Informal 
Economy in Tanzania (1997) ch 2. 
129
 Bagachwa et al (eds.) (1992) ch 2. 
130
 There are corporations which was established under certain acts like the Tanzania Posts and 
Telecommunication Corporation Act No. 17 of 1977 as amended time to time give the minister 
responsible for matters relating to posts and telecommunication to direct and control the 
corporation. 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
The main features of corporate governance in state owned corporations were 
corruption (embezzlement and nepotism), managerial incompetency, political 
interference and government subsidisation of failing corporations. Corporations 
were shielded from the discipline of the market,
131
 control and accountability 
became the prime causality of these corporations. The lack of accountability and 
effective control of these corporations left the managers with unfettered 
powers
132
which lead to misappropriation of corporate properties that were owned 
by the state 
 
The problem of control and accountability in state owned enterprises is not the 
problem of Tanzania only as it was also largely experienced by other countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The paucity of corporate governance in Sub-Saharan Africa 
arises from the ambiguous relationship between the state (the owner of the 
corporation), the board of directors and the senior management. Failure of many 
state owned corporations in Tanzania was due to the lack of effective corporate 
governance.
133
  
 
3.2.1Control by central coordination 
 
Corporate governance of the state owned corporations in Tanzania was done by a 
centrally-coordinated system which involved the people, the ruling party and the 
government. Tanzanian people through their government controlled these 
corporations directly and indirectly. Direct governance involved the use of social 
pressure on the managers of the corporation. For example, complaints about the 
conduct of managers that were reported in the media constituted one of the 
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deterrents to the abuse of the power vested on them.
134
 Social pressure is 
recognised as one of the mechanisms by which corporations can be controlled.
135
 
 
The ruling party also governed these corporations through its directives and by 
appointment of the party representatives who were placed in corporation 
offices.
136
 These representatives reported directly to the National party organs 
such as National Executive Committee (NEC) on the performance of the 
corporation. Such reporting system gave representatives significant influence in 
the management of the state owned corporation. Managers feared the disciplinary 
action that could be taken against them if they were reported to the NEC. 
 
3.2.2 Parliamentary Control  
 
Parliamentary control was and is still another way of exercising control over state 
owned corporations. In 1978, the parliament established a Parastatal Organisation 
Account Committee which serves as an important control mechanism. The duty 
of this committee was to verify whether funds were utilised legally, appropriately 
and on approved project or services. The committee employed the services of 
controller and auditor general (CAG) and Tanzania Audit Corporation to check 
the budget overturns and the reasons thereof. It also checked if there is 
extravagant spending of public funds.
137
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3.2.3 Presidential and ministerial control 
 
Presidential/ministerial control over the state owned corporations was both 
formal and informal. The formal control applied to those corporations established 
by Acts which provides that they should report direct to the president or minister 
of the respective sector.  Informal control was done through appointment of the 
chief executives/ chairman of the holding corporation. According to the 1969 and 
1992 Public Corporation Acts and the amendment done in 1993 and 1999,
138
 the 
appointments have to be based on the recommendations by the sector ministries. 
The borrowing powers of such a corporation are also vested in the president or 
minister of that sector.
 139
 
 
The 1992 Act
140
 (as amended) still requires the responsible minister to give 
directives to corporations. Section 6 of the Act states: 
‘[W]here the government is the sole shareholder, the minister responsible may in writing 
under his hand give the board of directors of the public corporation direction of a general 
or specific character as to the performance of their functions.’ 
When directors are the appointee of the minister the board provides the link 
between the minister and the management of the corporation. 
 
3.2.4 Central control 
 
Another way of governing state owned corporations was through central control. 
For instance, the Bank of Tanzania (BOT) is empowered to control banks and 
financial institutions through the Government Loan Guarantee and Grants Act of 
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1975; the Tanzania Audit Corporation; the National Price Commission and the 
Standing Committee for Parastatal Organisations. 
 
The treasury registrar was established for the purpose of controlling and 
allocating the resources of the government.
141
 The ministry of finance is 
empowered to acquire, hold and manage investments of the government through 
a finance and credit plan under the central control. 
 
3.3 CURRENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME IN TANZANIA  
 
The economic crisis of the 1980’s in Tanzania was mainly caused by the paucity 
of corporate governance of the state owned corporations.
142
 (For instance 
directors were not running the corporations for the interests of the state but for 
their own interests).
143
 Because of shortage of local capital to run the public 
corporations, the Tanzanian government reformed her policies into the 
privatisation of the state owned corporations. President Nyerere observed that: 
‘...[W]hen we benefit (through private capital) by increasing employment opportunities; 
by increasing government revenue; by the wealth produced locally and so on, then we 
should welcome private  enterprises...this is one of the matter about which we must start 
with the world as we find it. To be truly revolutionary we must be absolutely realistic 
and use what opportunities the world provides.’144 
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The method used for privatising state owned corporations was through ‘strategic 
investors.’145 This has effect on corporate governance as it provides an 
opportunity to a number of individuals to acquire significant holdings in the 
privatised corporation and hence concentration of ownership in a corporation.
146
 
The research done in five companies listed on the DSE revealed that the 
controlling shareholders in those companies own more than 50% of shares which 
provides them with controlling rights and incentives to exercise control.
147
 
 
Corporate governance in Tanzania as in other developing economies has adopted 
a mixture of aspects of the corporate governance structures found in developed 
markets.
148
 This is usually facilitated by legal systems which tend to reflect the 
legacy of the linked colonial past between developing countries and developed 
western market economies.
149
 Tanzania being a member of the commonwealth its 
legal system is highly affected by British laws. The Companies Ordinance and 
the new Companies Act of 2002 (cap 212) contain some principles which were 
applied in England in the 17
th
 century.
150
  
 
The mode of corporate governance applied in Tanzania is the Anglo-Saxon 
model which reflects the liberalist approach to corporate governance. This model 
applies to the US, the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, South Africa and 
other members of the Commonwealth.
151
 Under this model, shareholders interest 
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and their power in decision making are emphasised.  The fact that shareholders 
have invested their capital in the company gives them power over other 
stakeholders in managerial decision making.
152
  
 
The role of donor countries and the international financial institutions with 
respect to the development of corporate governance practices in developing 
countries cannot be underestimated. The influence of the IMF and the World 
Bank may result in a system which does not reflect socio economic and local 
requirements for an effective corporate governance system. It has been contended 
that the preparation of the Companies Act No. 12 of 2002 relied heavily on 
foreign consultants and did not provide local stakeholders with the opportunity to 
contribute to the development of the Act.
153
  
 
The control and governance of corporations in Tanzania is done by both internal 
and external mechanism. The internal mechanism is through the memorandum 
and articles of association (MEMARTS) which contains rules for the organisation 
to be followed by its directors and managers. The external mechanism includes 
legal rules and regulatory framework.  
 
3.4 LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
The legal and regulatory framework is the basic mechanism outside the firm. It refers 
to the laws and regulations that govern the establishment and cessation of firms and 
their operations in a country.154 The function of laws and regulations with respect 
to corporate governance is to provide a framework within which various 
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http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/ (accessed August 2012). 
.
153
 Mndolwa EB, Binamungu CS &Kashonda MA ‘The Companies Act No 12 of 2002 and the 
People’s Expectations: The Mismatch and Missed Opportunities; Accounting, Liquidation and 
Governance Aspects of the Law’ (2002) The Accountant 23. 
154Denise KD & McConnell JJ ‘International Corporate Governance’ (2003) Working Paper No 
05/2003. http://www.ecgi.org/wp (accessed September 2012). 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
organisations can relate to one another. They describe the relationship that must 
exist between management and various stakeholders.
155
  
 
They also encourage managers to pursue shareholder interests. In situations 
where effective legal protections are lacking, investors are likely to be extremely 
reluctant to give up resources in exchange for a promise because if such promise 
is violated there is no clear penalty they can impose.
156
 La Porta concluded that 
countries with strong legal systems are likely to get many more investors than 
their counter parts.
157
 The legislative measures can encourage self-regulations by 
directors and managers.
158
  
 
The OECD principles of effective corporate governance have emphasised the 
need to develop a corporate governance legal and regulatory framework and 
include issues that should be addressed including the rights of shareholders, and 
the equitable treatment of shareholders and other stakeholders. These principles 
also encourage countries to enforce relevant laws and regulations.
159
 
 
The legal and regulatory framework also influences the effectiveness of other 
mechanisms and in particular the way they evolve.
160
 For example, the legal and 
regulatory framework influences ownership structure of corporations in Tanzania 
to a large extent.  
Legal and regulatory framework for corporate governance in Tanzania is divided 
into two broad categories:  
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i) Legal rules and regulations ( including quasi-legal regulations) 
ii) Guidelines for corporate governance (in particular the Capital Markets 
and securities Authority (CMSA) guidelines and the Steering 
Committee guidelines.) 
 
The legal regulation for corporate governance in Tanzania is underpinned by the 
corporate laws and securities laws and regulations. Corporate laws include the 
Companies Act no. 12 of 2002 (Cap 212 of the laws of Tanzania) which came 
into force in March 2006 and the Public Corporations Act 1992 (as discussed in 
3.2 above). Securities law is covered by the Capital Markets and Securities Act 
(CMSA) No. 5 of 1994, guidelines for corporate governance established under 
CMSA to be used by listed companies in DSE and Steering Committee. 
 
3.4.1 Companies Act No.12 of 2002 
 
The Companies Act No. 12 of 2002 was assented to by the President on 27 June 
2002 and came into effect from 1 March 2006. The new law repealed the 
Companies Ordinance of 1932, an archaic piece of legislation based on the 
English Companies Act of 1929. The new act aimed to put in place a relevant and 
modern legal framework. The legal system of Tanzania is affected by its 
predecessor colonial master, the British legal system. The framework of 
corporate governance under the Companies Act is to promote a moderate 
shareholder-oriented system of governance; however the ownership structure of 
companies may fetter the achievement of this goal.
161
 
 
Chapter VII of the Act provides duties and liabilities of the Directors. The Act 
partially codifies these duties. This has increased accountability of directors by 
amplifying their duties and clearly documenting them. Previously, directors’ 
duties were primarily covered by the common law. The purpose of partial 
codification is to make the law clear and more accessible, particularly to 
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directors. In particular, the Act requires directors to exercise their power for 
proper purpose,
162
 to act honestly and in good faith for the best interest of the 
company.
163
  
 
Directors are also required to consider the interests of employees when 
performing their duties.
164
 The implementation of such requirement can be 
problematic both conceptually and in practice. Conceptually, shareholder 
interests and those of employees tend to conflict. For example, employees desire 
stable employment and higher salaries, while shareholders require a greater return 
on their investments in the form of dividends and capital gains. The questions 
arise here about the criteria for resolving these conflicting interests. In practice, 
the implementation of this provision is problematic because directors are 
appointed or elected by shareholders.  
 
Directors owe their positions and hence allegiance to the company and not to the 
employees. It is submitted that there is a possibility of the directors to act on the 
interest of the dominant/large shareholders due to the corporate ownership 
existing in Tanzania unless an inclusive approach is adopted which address as the 
interest of other shareholders as recommended by the King III Report of South 
Africa. The inclusive approach is also recommended by the Commonwealth 
Association for Corporate Governance (CACG).
165
 
 
The fiduciary duties of directors are of greater importance because the 
Companies Act confers on the board of directors a statutory power and duty to 
manage the business and the affairs of the company subject to the company’s 
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 Section 183 (1) the matters to which the directors of the company are to have regard in the 
performance of their functions includes, in addition to the interests of the members, the interests 
of the company's employees. 
(2) The duty imposed by this section on the directors is owed by them to the company (and the 
company alone) and is enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary duty owed to a 
company by its directors. 
165
See CACG Principles for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth: Towards Global 
Competitiveness and Economic Accountability (1999) 3. See also discussion in chapter 4.5 with 
regard to stakeholders’ rights. 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
memorandum of incorporation.
166
 However, their effectiveness in the control 
function varies from company to company. The effectiveness is conditioned by 
the ownership structure and the extent of shareholder control. Where shareholder 
control is significant, the board of directors tends to be less involved in control, 
and becomes a mere legal requirement or at best an advisory committee. The 
director can be removed by an ordinary shareholders resolution notwithstanding 
provisions to the contrary in the memorandum and articles or in any agreement 
with him.
167
 This is evidence that the controlling shareholders have a significant 
control of the company.  
 
It is compulsory to appoint the first company secretary before registration. 
However there is no formal qualification requirement prescribed.
168
 The Act also 
provides for protection of third parties dealing with a company in good faith. 
These people are not required to review the company’s memorandum and articles 
to check on the powers of the directors. The doctrine of constructive notice and 
doctrine of ultra-vires are no longer applicable in such cases.
169
 
 
There are significant information and power asymmetries between controlling 
and minority shareholders in the Tanzanian context. In the current set-up, 
minority shareholders cannot effectively influence the decision-making process 
and they generally lack representation on the decision-making boards of directors 
of companies.
170
 In annual general meetings, which they rely on for information 
on the performance of the corporations, they do not have an adequate voice 
which makes them vulnerable. 
 
However, in order to protect minority interests any member of a company can 
make an application to the court for its intervention or for permission to start a 
                                                          
166
 Section 181 of the Act provides that ‘Subject to any modifications, exceptions, or limitations 
contained in this Act or in the company's articles, the directors of a company have all the powers 
necessary for managing, and for directing and supervising the management of, the business and 
affairs of a company’. 
167
 Section 193. 
168
 Sections 14&187. 
169
 Sections35-38. 
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 Melyoki LL (2005) ch 6 pp 204-224. 
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derivative action on behalf of the company if the affairs of the company are being 
conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the 
members in general or the minority in particular.
171
  
 
In managing finances of the company, books of account are required to be 
preserved for six years from the date on which they are made up.
172
 Directors are 
required to prepare individual company accounts as well as consolidated group 
accounts, both of which will show a true and fair view in accordance with the 
generally accepted accounting practices by National Board of Accountants and 
Auditors (NBAA) regulations.
173
  
 
The auditor’s report should cover each component of individual accounts as well 
as group accounts (balance sheet, profit and loss account and cash flow 
statement). Auditors are also required to report whether the contents of the 
directors’ report are consistent with those in the accounts.174 The Act prohibits 
directors to be remunerated tax free and no loan from the company should be 
provided to a director or any other person connected to him.
175
  
 
The power of shareholders to influence decision-making is exercised at the 
annual general meeting. Among the key decisions made by shareholders during 
these meetings is the election of directors and auditors. Directors’ remuneration is 
also decided upon during these meetings. In practice, directors propose 
remuneration to shareholders at the annual general meeting, who then debate and 
approve them. Directors are empowered to propose auditors and determine the 
auditors’ fees.176 
 
The board system applied in Tanzania reflects the British one-tier board, in which 
board, management and control roles are combined. As in other countries, the 
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 Sections 233,234. 
172
 Section 151. 
173
 Section 154. 
174
 Section 161. 
175
 Section 199-200. 
176
 See s170(5) & (8). 
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management of the company is vested by law in the board of directors.
177
 In 
practice, the board of directors appoints a chief executive officer to whom it 
delegates the responsibility for the management of the day-to-day affairs of the 
company and retains for itself the decision control role. The CEO is therefore 
accountable to the board of directors. The Act is silent on the issue of having 
executive and non-executive directors in the board. Although the CMSA and 
Steering Committee guidelines recommend it, compliance is not guaranteed due 
to the compliance nature of the guidelines. It should be noted that the guidelines 
applied only to the listed companies. The Act also does not provide for the 
separation of the post of the CEO and chairman of the board which is among the 
main principles advocated internationally in order to have an independent 
board.
178
 
 
3.4.2 Capital Markets and Securities Act No. 5 of 1994 
 
Reflecting the characteristics of developing countries with regard to their 
underdeveloped equity markets, the importance of the stock exchange in the 
economy of Tanzania is currently low. The stock market was introduced in 1996, 
and DSE was established in 1997 but currently only seventeen companies are 
listed on the DSE - Tanzania Breweries Limited, Tanzania Cigarette Company, 
Tanga Cement, Swiss port Tanzania Limited, Tanzania Oxygen Limited, 
Tanzania Tea Packers , Kenya Airways Limited, Kenya Commercial Bank 
Limited, Tanzania Portland Cement Company Limited, East Africa Breweries 
Limited, Jubilee Holdings Limited, CRDB Bank Plc, National Media Group 
Limited, African Barrick Gold Plc, Precision Air Services Plc, Dar es Salaam 
Community Bank and National Microfinance Bank Plc.
179
 
 
                                                          
177
 Section 183. 
178
 See generally the OECD principles of Corporate governance, King report III and discussion in 
chapter 4.3. 
179
 This information was retrieved from the Capital markets and Securities Authority website 
http://cmsa-tz.org (accessed 7
 
September 2012). 
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Until 2003, merger and acquisition was not allowed on shares listed on the DSE. 
Following the enactments of the Fair Competition Act of 2003 and the 
introduction of relevant regulations, these restrictions have been eased.
180
 
However, some restrictions still remain; for example, foreigners (corporate and 
individuals) are not allowed to hold shares in a corporation that exceeds 60% of 
the equity of that company. The initiative to allow foreigners and foreign firms to 
transact and to list at the exchange is an attempt to improve the liquidity and 
depth
181
 of the stock market.  
 
This position of law led to the underdeveloped capital markets because the 
indigenous investors were not able to buy shares in the privatised companies. On 
the other hand, Kenya which is the counterpart member of EAC, put a limit as to 
what extent the foreign investors can own shares in Kenyan companies since 
2002. The 75 per cent
182
 was left free float for all classes of investors, with no 
restriction on the amount held by a foreign investor.
183
 Recently, the legal 
threshold of foreign ownership of a public listed company in Kenya has been 
reduced from 75 per cent to 60 per cent.
184
  
 
An active market for corporate control is currently non-existent in Tanzania. 
There have been no hostile takeovers reported in Tanzania since the listing of 
corporations was introduced in 1997. Apart from disclosures required by 
regulatory authorities, i.e. the CMSA and DSE, there are no legal restrictions that 
prevent takeovers or mergers. Transferability of shares is also permitted by the 
Companies Act
185
 as well as by the listing regulations. 
 
                                                          
180
 Capital Markets and Securities (Substantial Acquisitions, Takeovers and Mergers) Regulations 
2006.  
181
 Liquidity refers to the rate at which shares and securities are bought and sold. Depth refers to 
the number and type of shares and securities traded at the stock exchange (i.e. bought and sold). 
182
 Legal Notice 134 of 2002 referring to para 3(1) first set the limits at 75%. 
183
 Nairobi Stock Exchange Ltd (NSE), Market Fact File 2007. 
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 Legal Notice 98 of 2007 referring to para.3(a) published on June 14, 2007. 
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 See s74 of Cap. 212. 
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Provisions under Part IX
186
 of the Capital Markets and Securities Act prohibit 
conduct like creating false trading and market rigging activities and market 
manipulation. The use of fictitious transactions or devices to maintain, inflate or 
depress or cause fluctuation in the market price of any securities is also 
prohibited.
187
 Any person violating Part IX is liable to a fine of not less than five 
million Tanzanian Shillings or imprisonment for a period not less than five years 
or both such fine and imprisonment.
188
 He is also liable to pay compensation of 
the loss sustained by the person claiming compensation.
189
 
 
3.5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES IN TANZANIA 
 
3.5.1 The Steering Committee Guidelines on Corporate Governance of 2000 
 
These guidelines generally reflect an explicit recognition of the economic and 
social responsibilities expected from corporations by Tanzanian society, and 
these concern the creation of wealth, the provision of employment and ensuring 
the long-term survival of corporations.
190
 In executing these responsibilities, 
directors are called upon to recognize the legitimate rights of the corporations’ 
stakeholders including investors, suppliers, creditors, employees and society at 
large.
191
 
 
Under principle 8 the guidelines appear to underpin the consideration of 
stakeholders in corporate governance. It reflects a belief that, in the long-term, 
corporations can address economic and social responsibilities only if the 
legitimate rights and interests of the stakeholders are taken into account in 
decision-making processes. These guidelines do not provide for the 
representation of stakeholders other than shareholders in the organisational 
decision-making organs such as boards of directors. In this respect, they are in 
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 See ss46-53. 
187
 Section 106 of CMSA. 
188
 Section 113. 
189
 Section 113 (1)(2) &(3). 
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 See the introductory part of the guidelines. 
191
 Principle 8. 
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line with the shareholder instrumental view of the firm and therefore remain 
within the legal framework which recognises shareholders as the only 
organizational constituency represented in a company's decision- making board. 
 
Corporate decision-makers are also called upon in the guidelines to institute 
codes of ethics which should explain the values of the corporation and set the 
framework for the corporation’s policy and behaviour as a key component of 
effective corporate governance.
192
 In this respect, the guidelines are underpinned 
by the belief that ethics and corporate governance should be developed together. 
The guidelines require directors and managers to monitor the social 
responsibilities of corporations and disseminate policies which reflect the 
legitimate interests and acceptable business practices of the corporate entities.
193
 
 
The notions of “fairness" and "equity” are emphasised as guiding principles in 
the decision-making process involving employment, the protection of the 
environment, gender interests, children’s rights and the rights of vulnerable 
groups in society. The guidelines are not explicit as to what should be done in 
practice to meet the requirement of “fairness and equity”. In this regard, 
managers and directors are left to apply their discretion.
194
 
 
The recommended guidelines address issues of corporate governance in both 
state-owned and privately-owned corporations. The issues discussed include the 
function of the directors and the factors that determine the effectiveness of the 
boards of directors with respect to the control function.
195
 
 
In addition to the guidelines that apply to the corporations in general, the 
guidelines address issues specific to privately-owned companies. This is because 
of the increasing importance of privately owned corporations to the economy of 
                                                          
192
 Principle 1. 
193
 See principle 1 also principle 8.  
194
 Principle 5. 
195
 Principles 1&9 among other thing it require the separation of position of the CEO and the 
chairman of the board. 
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Tanzania. Issues of shareholder rights and control, board control activities and 
determinants of board effectiveness with respect to control are addressed.
196
 
 
3.5.2 Capital Markets and Securities Authority (CMSA's) Guidelines of 2002 
 
The CMSA has developed and recommended its own set of guidelines on 
corporate governance to be adopted by public listed companies in Tanzania 
which came into operation in 2002. The initiative by CMSA reflects the current 
international trend with respect to corporate governance since this involves the 
development of guidelines (principles) for effective corporate governance. The 
CMSA acknowledges the influence of the principles for effective corporate 
governance developed by the OECD.
197
 The CMSA recommended guidelines 
take a shareholder instrumental view of organisations. It states in its introduction 
that: 
 
‘[T]he adoption of international standards on corporate governance best practices for 
public companies in Tanzania is essential in order to maximise shareholder value 
through effective and efficient management of corporate resources.’198 
 
The guidelines have addressed in detail various aspects of shareholder rights and 
control, board control activities, and determinants of board effectiveness with 
respect to the control function.
199
 Directors are expected to perform a number of 
activities to protect and further the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders of the company.
200
  
 
The Board is required to establish relevant committees and delegate specific 
mandates to such committees as may be necessary. The CMSA pointed out that 
companies should establish audit and nominating committees.
201
 The guidelines 
                                                          
196
 Generally see Part II. 
197
 See introductory part of the CMSA para 1.2. 
198
 Paragraph 1.1. 
199
 See para 3.1, 3.2  and 3.3.  
200
 See para  4.1.1 (i)-(viii). 
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 Paragraph 3.1.1 (i) and (ii). 
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further specify the way in which such a committee should be constituted and led. 
Compliance with this recommendation may fall short because of the lack of legal 
power to enforce it.  
 
The approach adopted in these guidelines is viewed as being prescriptive as well 
as descriptive. This means that companies are required to adopt certain aspects of 
the guidelines but have the option to implement or not.
202
 However, no clear 
strategy has been put in place to encourage companies to implement these 
guidelines. The guideline is prescriptive as it has been developed for public listed 
companies and any other issuers of securities through the capital markets 
including issuers of debt instruments in Tanzania’s capital market. Companies in 
the private sector are encouraged to practice good corporate governance but they 
are not bound to apply it. This should be addressed in order to attract more 
investors in Tanzania.  
 
3.6 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGAL AND REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TANZANIA 
 
Various economic reforms undertaken by the government aimed to put in place 
laws and policies that will facilitate a favourable investment environment for 
local and foreign projects. During the mid-1990’s the government initiated and 
enacted a number of investment related laws and policies in recognition of the 
important role towards creating an enabling environment for the development of 
a private sector. Some of them are: Tanzania Investment Act No. 26 of 1997 
aimed at guiding investment activities in Tanzania except for the mining and oil 
exploration projects; Banking and Financial Institutions Act No.12 of 1991 which 
intends to harmonise the operations of all financial institutions in Tanzania and to 
regulate credit operations and to provide for other related matters; Mining Act 
No. 5 of 1998 which provides for mineral mining, trading and any other related 
matters; Capital Markets and Securities Act No.5 of 1995 which provides for the 
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 Paragraph 1.6. Listed companies are encouraged to comply with the guidelines and they have 
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establishment of the CMSA for the purpose of promoting and facilitating the 
development of capital markets and securities in Tanzania and the establishment 
of the DSE. 
 
Despite all these initiatives, the capital market is still underdeveloped.
203
 The 
evaluation by the World Bank in 2012 in East Africa region with regards to 
investors protection ranked Tanzania at the 4
th
 position while Rwanda is the 
leading followed by Burundi, Kenya and Uganda.
204
  
 
The provisions of the laws which govern corporate governance in Tanzania 
attempt to protect the investors but they are not adequate to fit all types of 
business in the modern world. The securities laws and the stock exchange which 
were established for the purpose of privatisation cannot fit market requirements 
for companies which are not listed for privatisation purposes.  
 
Although the influence of laws and regulations is recognised, their effectiveness 
in encouraging managers to make decisions that maximise shareholder wealth is 
contestable. Jensen points out that the legal and regulatory framework ‘is far 
more blunt an instrument to handle problems of wasteful managerial behaviour 
effectively as courts do not as a matter of practice question the judgment of 
management.’205 
 
The US has been regarded as having strong legal and regulatory framework
206
 but 
yet it failed to prevent the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. 
The collapse of Enron and other corporate scams is the evidence that the legal 
and regulatory framework alone cannot prevent the managers from pursuing their 
own interest to the detriment of shareholders and other stakeholders. The US 
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 See discussion under ch 3. 
204
 Doing business in EAC 2012. 
205
 Jensen MC ‘The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control 
Systems’ (1993) Journal of Finance 839. 
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 La Porta R et al (1997) 1131-39. 
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government enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 whose application is 
mandatory to all corporations. It was established in order to strengthen the legal 
and regulatory framework and make it effective. Despite the existence and 
application of the SOX legislation, the US experienced the global financial crisis 
of 2007-2008 which has shaken the world’s economy. 
 
Despite the existence of legal framework for corporate governance in Tanzania, 
the level of flow of investment in a country is still small and Tanzania is still 
considered among the poorest countries in the world. The Companies Act falls 
short in promoting and protecting investors due to the fact that the large 
shareholders are the ones who are highly protected compared to minorities. Such 
situation can be a barrier to both local and foreign investors who are interested to 
invest in the listed companies with controlling shareholders.
207
  
 
The guidelines recommended by both CMSA and Steering Committee are robust 
but the framework that exists in the corporate regime does not give way for their 
application especially to those companies with controlling shareholders. This is 
due to a lack of legal rules to back up the recommended guidelines as well as the 
weak enforcement mechanisms that exist in the country.  
 
The former corporate governance system of state owned corporations in Tanzania 
was a complex system which faced a number of problems with respect to control 
and accountability. At the level of the people and the party, it can be argued that, 
when ownership is so fragmented, free rider problems occur which lead to an 
absence of monitoring.
208
 It cannot be expected that people would have the ability 
to monitor the management effectively. At the level of presidential and 
ministerial control level there is a problem for the lack of checks as the minister 
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 World Bank Report on Doing Business in Tanzania (2012) 58 available at 
www.doingbussiness.org (accessed 4
 
April 2013). 
208
 See Hart O ‘Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications’ (1995) Economic Journal 
678. Free rider problems refer to owners of a corporation who individually hold only a small 
number of shares and who thus individually lack an incentive to monitor management and take 
corrective action. 
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or president can be misled by his subordinates on the performance of a board of 
executive officers. 
 
The ineffectiveness of the corporate governance of state-owned corporations 
contributed to their poor performance. Gregory and Simms suggest that the 
effectiveness of corporate governance will be reflected in a firm’s 
performance.
209
 By the late 1980s, the public corporations were regarded as such 
a burden on the state
210
 that they had to be divested. 
 
The legal and regulatory framework of corporate governance in state owned 
corporations is generally considered weak because of the inefficient enforcement 
of the law and regulations.
211
 The system does not provide a plausible warning 
that violation of promises will be efficiently punished in such contexts. 
 
Business entities are growing and becoming more and more interdependent. The 
rise of business transactions necessarily entails also a rise in commercial disputes, 
whose resolutions form an essential component to a thriving and vibrant business 
environment, and hence the relevance of a formal system for resolving 
commercial disputes. Despite the fact that Tanzania is ranked by the Word Bank 
to be the top performer in enforcing contracts in the East Africa region,
212
 there 
are still many challenges facing the Commercial Court Division. Such challenges 
are: case-delays; backlogs of cases; limited access to justice; lack of transparency 
and predictability in court decisions; shortage of financial, physical and other 
resources; and weak public confidence in the judicial system. 
213
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 Monks R & Minow N (eds) Corporate Governance 2ed (2002) ch 3. 
210
 A study conducted by the Ministry of Finance in 1974 of 24 parastatals showed that, by the 
end of 1973, they had accumulated TAS 178 million (equivalent to US$ 35.6 million at that time) 
in losses which accounted for 91% of the total capital allocated to these parastatals. 
211
 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) Presidential Commission of Inquiry: Report on the State 
of Corruption in the country (1996). 
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 Tanzania is ranked at 36
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 position out of 185 economies evaluated by the World Bank in the 
Doing Business’ program in 2012. For more information see www.doingbusiness.org (accessed 4 
April 2013). 
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 Makaramba RV ‘Ten Years of the Commercial Division of the High Court of Tanzania: 
Commercial Disputes Resolution in the wake of Global Economy Recession: Commercial 
Disputes Resolution in Tanzania: Challenges and Prospects (2009) 9 A paper to be presented at 
the Roundtable Discussion held at the Paradise City Hotel Benjamin Mkapa Towers. 
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Transparency and integrity is of most importance for the enforcement organs 
such as the judiciary. The problem of high levels of corruption is another thing 
which makes enforcement of corporate governance principles problematic in 
Tanzania to the extent that it cannot threaten managers to pursue the interest of 
the company.
214
 The Presidential Commission in Tanzania, chaired by Justice 
Warioba, stated in the report on the ‘State of Corruption in Tanzania’ that: 
‘[O]ur country has witnessed an alarming increase in incidences of corruption involving 
public servants on the one hand and the members of the public who are seeking public 
services on the other hand. Corruption has been fanned by the existence of loopholes 
inherent in procedures, temptations, greed for property, meagre incomes and erosion of 
ethics. Moreover state organs entrusted with the task of checking the proliferation of 
corruption has succumbed to this scourge leaving the public with no refuge.’215  
 
The enforcement mechanisms in Tanzania can be fettered due to the lack of 
multiple enforcement organs. Apart from the commercial court which was 
established in 1999, other dispute resolution organs are the Tax Revenue Appeals 
Tribunal, which is established under the Tax Revenue Appeals Act
216
 and the Fair 
Competition Tribunal which is established under the Fair Competition Act.
217
 
Hence, the reliance on judicial system may lead to long delays in dispute 
resolution on corporate issues. Tanzania needs to have alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) established out of the limb of the  commercial court in order to 
expedite commercial disputes and save time and costs for investors. 
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 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) Presidential Commission of Inquiry: Report on the State 
of Corruption in the Country (1996). 
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 Warioba JS Remarks at the opening of the University of Dar es Salaam Annual Convocation 
Symposium, Dar es Salaam. (2003). see also Chachage SLC (2003). 
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 Cap. 408 Revised Edition (R.E) 2002, in s8 (1) the Act establishes the Tax Revenue Appeals 
Tribunal (TRAT), whose chairman is a judge of the High Court. 
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 Cap.285 R.E 2002, in s4(1) the Act establishes the Fair Competition Tribunal (FCT) whose 
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3.7 CONCLUSION 
 
From above discussion, it can be acknowledged that policy makers and regulators 
in Tanzania have put a lot of effort in promoting good corporate governance so as 
to align the country with global standards by establishing guidelines for corporate 
governance. 
 
The Tanzanian legal framework seems to be more robust compared to that of 
Kenya but still is suffering from low flow of FDI.
218
 The problem is in the 
enforcement and compliance of the existing legal regulatory rules. There, 
however, remain a number of challenges the country has to attend to in order to 
achieve full compliance with corporate governance principles. The main 
challenges that Tanzania has encountered are, among others, lack of competent 
and committed human resources; poor regulatory oversight; lack of adherence to 
the regulatory framework, and inadequate transparency and disclosure; 
inadequate legal and judicial frameworks; corruption and ineffective compliance 
mechanisms.
219
 
 
Furthermore, many of the regulatory bodies that are meant to provide checks and 
balances within the system (including prosecuting systems) have insufficient 
resources, skills, infrastructure, and independence to enforce the laws and 
regulations.
 220
 The failure of stringent requirements to achieve full corporate 
governance compliance shows that there is more to corporate governance than 
just laws and regulations. All players have to be committed to practice good 
corporate governance. 
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 See comparison in chapter 4. 
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The corporate regime in Tanzania is positioned in such a way that it is for the 
companies with controlling shareholders. This is also a limitation because the 
development of the EAC and SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) encourages
221
 cross 
boarder investment hence the legal framework has to accommodate the issue of 
minority shareholder rights. 
 
Tanzanian legislature and policy makers therefore, still have a lot of work 
towards enhancing voluntary compliance, strengthening enforcement and 
prosecution mechanisms, encouraging sufficient disclosure and reporting, 
reducing corruption and encouraging shareholders participation especially 
minorities who are not well protected by the law as their counterpart controlling 
shareholders.  
                                                          
221
 The EAC FTA is operational and Tanzania is among of its members. At the same time The 
SADC FTA was launched since 2008 and custom union was to be launched by 2010 but to date 
they are working on how to harmonise tariff among member countries. The two regional blocs i.e. 
EAC and SADC want to form a tripartite FTA with Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA). This is the initiative of Africa Union to have a continental FTA. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
A COMPARISON OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LEGAL AND 
REGULATORY MECHANISMS OF TANZANIA, KENYA AND SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Corporate governance practices have undergone fundamental changes during the 
past few decades.  The collapses of some big companies have motivated many 
countries to put in place advanced systems that promote higher standards of 
ethical conduct, accountability and transparency in companies and by directors.
222
 
A number of corporate governance misfortunes occurred in the financial sector, 
resulting in the collapse and absorption of a number of financial institutions.
223
 
These collapses, among others, highlighted the risk of concentrating power and 
decision making in the hands of a few individuals which has led to a general 
consensus around the world that there is need for power balance in companies.
224
 
 
In this regard, one of the major concerns of corporate governance has been the 
extent to which executive directors exercise their powers and whether such 
powers should be restricted.
225
 Other matters are financial management, 
shareholders rights and their role in corporate governance as well as the 
government role in putting in place good corporate governance regime. For the 
purpose of this chapter it is worth to outline the main source of corporate 
governance laws and regulations before embarking on making comparisons.  
                                                          
222
 Moloi STM ‘Assessment of Corporate Governance Reporting in the Annual Reports of South 
African Listed Companies’(published MSc Thesis, University of South Africa 2008) 1-3. 
223
 Smit P J, Management Principles: A Contemporary Edition for Africa, (2007) 15-18. 
Examples of financial institutions that collapsed are the Saambou Bank Limited and Regal 
Treasury Bank. 
224
 This is reflected by the number of corporate governance codes the world over which all 
provide for the need to separate powers between executive and non-executive directors and 
between the chairman and chief executive officer of a company. 
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 Coyle B (2003) 44-51. This aspect of corporate governance is, inter alia, about the structure of 
board of directors, the role of independent non-executive directors and the powers of shareholders 
under company law. 
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The main sources of corporate governance in South Africa are the King Reports 
on Corporate Governance (which forms the basis of the debate on corporate 
governance in South Africa), Acts of Parliament, particularly the Companies Act 
71 of 2008, JSE Listings Requirements and common law. This work will mostly 
focus on the King Reports, Companies Act, and JSE Listing Requirements with 
brief references to other selected Acts that positively impact on corporate 
governance. On the other hand, Kenyan corporate governance regime is exercised 
mainly from the Companies Act of 2009, common law and Capital Markets 
Authority (CMA) Guidelines. The Tanzania legal framework for corporate 
governance is based on the Companies Act 2002, common law, securities laws 
and corporate governance guidelines.
226
  
 
The corporate governance comparisons in the three countries (South Africa, 
Kenya and Tanzania) is focussed on  ownership structure and shareholder 
control; the board control and effectiveness, audit committee; shareholder rights 
and other stakeholder’s rights and the government involvement in corporate 
governance. 
 
4.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND SHAREHOLDER CONTROL 
 
The nature of the debate on corporate governance is influenced by the way in 
which corporations are viewed. The early conceptualisation of corporations 
tended to treat corporations as the property of equity capital providers 
(shareholders) for the pursuance of their economic interests. However, an 
essential characteristic of a corporation is its ability to have a separate existence 
apart from those who own it.
227
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 See chapter 3 for detailed discussion on the Tanzania Legal framework for corporate 
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4.2.1 Tanzania 
 
The Tanzania corporate ownership is characterized by concentrated ownership 
whereby many of the companies listed in the DSE have controlling shareholders 
holding more than 50% of the stock which provides them with controlling rights 
and incentives to exercise control.
228
 This reflects the privatisation strategy 
employed in divesting control of the state owned companies by selling of a large 
number of shares to strategic investors. 
 
Shareholder control is exercised through participating in decision making process 
of these companies. The controlling shareholders are the ones who appoint 
directors,
229
 and set internal procedures and mechanisms which further ensure 
that management provides relevant information. Therefore, there is a possibility 
of the controlling shareholders to have more access to information than their 
counterparts who have to rely mainly on annual audited reports. The influence of 
these controlling shareholders is reflected in the annual general meeting of the 
company. When major decisions which require the shareholders’ approval at 
these meetings, the vote of the controlling shareholders determines the outcome.  
 
The concentration of ownership in Tanzania implies that separation of ownership 
from control has not really taken place in Tanzania. This supports the existing 
literature that, except for the US and the UK, in a large number of countries, 
ownership and control have not been separated.
230
  
 
4.2.2 Kenya 
 
Ownership of many listed companies on the NSE is concentrated in the hands of 
foreigners. For instance, 20 of the 58 companies listed on the NSE as of 1996 
were available for foreign investment. In the last decade, the government of 
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 See discussion in Chapter 3. 
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230
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Kenya in order to attract the flow of FDI, significantly reduced restrictions on 
foreign ownership in locally controlled companies from 20 per cent for investors 
and 25 per cent for single holdings to 40 per cent for investors and five per cent 
for single holdings in 1995.
231
  
 
Following these amendments, in 2002 the foreign investor regulations were 
amended to provide Kenyan citizens with a minimum ownership of 25 per cent 
while the balance of 75 per cent was left for investors.
 232
 The amendment done in 
2007 reduced foreign ownership to 60 per cent.
233
 This confirms that there are 
some companies whose ownership is still concentrated in the hands of foreign 
investors as the case of Tanzania. However, there are also a good number of 
companies whose ownership is separated from control.  Therefore, the minority 
shareholders rights in decision making are at risk in the companies with 
concentrated shareholdings. The majority shareholders also need to be protected 
in those companies where the ownership is separated from the control in order to 
protect their rights from abuse by the management.  
 
The CMA guidelines for corporate governance in Kenya recommended the 
protection of both major and minority shareholders. The structure of the board 
should comprise with a number of directors, which fairly reflects the Company’s 
shareholding structure. The composition of the board should also provide a 
mechanism for representation of the minority shareholders without undermining 
the collective responsibility of the directors.
234
 This however might be among the 
things which make the capital markets of Kenya more developed than that of 
Tanzania.  
                                                          
231
 Musikali LM ‘The Law Affecting Corporate Governance in Kenya: A Need for Review’ 
(2008) International Company and Commercial Law Review ( I.C.C.L.R) 220. 
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 Legal Notice 134 of 2002 referring to para.3(1). 
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4.2.3 South Africa 
 
During the apartheid era the mode of ownership and control of many listed 
companies was concentrated in a few individuals and companies.
235
 By 2000 
there were 608 companies listed in the main board of JSE whereby 390 of them 
had a shareholder with more than 30 per cent shareholding.
236
 This means that 
there was a substantial number of companies whose shares were concentrated in a 
few hands. This figure reflects almost two thirds of all listed companies. That 
means that the majority of the listed companies did not wield the legal control (by 
having more than 50% of shareholding). This ownership structure is different 
from that which exists in Tanzania whereby there are individuals and companies 
holding more than 50% of shares in a company. It can be concluded that South 
Africa has got both companies which have separation of management from 
ownership whereby single shareholders own not more than five percent of the 
companies share.
237
 Another category is those companies where there is a 
dominant shareholder who owns more than 50 per cent of shares, especially 
institutional investors.
238
 This dual system of ownership requires corporate 
governance standards which will strengthen the managerial accountability as well 
as protect the minority shareholders. 
 
The separation of management from ownership which results in the transfer of 
control of corporations from owners to professional managers, poses a significant 
challenge in controlling the management so that they can pursue the interest of all 
shareholders.
239
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King III Report having recognised the separation of ownership and control 
recommended the existence of a unitary board system. The board is supposed to 
consist of both executive and non-executive directors and in governing the 
business of the company allows committees to work side by side with the 
board.
240
 It also recommends the establishment of director’s remuneration 
committee in order to reduce expenses on investors thereby protecting them.. The 
reason behind having this committee was that the directors may decide to pay 
themselves offensive remuneration packages as these directors are not necessarily 
shareholders or substantial shareholders, therefore they pursue their own interest 
rather than shareholders’ interests. 
 
The Report places great emphasis on leadership, sustainability and corporate 
citizenship. The King III Report has placed great emphasis on an integrated 
report, which will evaluate the company’s impact on the economic life of the 
community in which it operates; sustainability issues pertinent to its business; the 
financial results; the results of its operational cash flow as well as many other 
matters.
241
 
 
The King III Report made many recommendations as to shareholders rights, audit 
committee, powers of directors and their duties,
242
 corporate citizenship and the 
responsibility of the board of the company to operate within a  triple faceted 
context i.e.: economic , social and environmental in order to make the managerial 
accountable. Companies have to adhere to social and ethical norms and the 
Report recommended for social and ethical committees
243
 which are also 
incorporated in the new Companies Act.
 244
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4.3 BOARD CONTROL AND EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Corporate governance begins with power. It is about those who hold the power in 
an organization, how it is delegated and exercised, its purpose, and what control 
mechanisms the power holders use. Those who have powers also have the 
responsibility of decision making, the right to choose, and the option to delegate. 
Power in a company is not absolute because it is always exercised within 
guidelines or constraints. In public corporations, the purpose of power is the 
creation of value, and the structure of shareholder owned corporations means that 
the value created must be shared. In this part I am going to compare and contrast 
board control and its effectiveness in the three countries, Tanzania, Kenya and 
South Africa. 
 
The board of directors is the one entrusted with the power to control the company 
therefore they must exercise it effectively for the interest of those who entrusted 
them. An effective board of directors is an important determinant of effective 
corporate governance.
245
  
 
4.3.1 Tanzania 
 
The Companies Act provides that the business of the company will be controlled 
by the directors of the company.
246
 However it does not specify what activities 
constitute ‘managing of a company’. There is also a proviso to the effect that it 
will be subject to MEMARTS of incorporation. The nature of company control 
by the majority shareholders made the company’s directors to be less involved in 
control.
247
 They are left with the duty to discuss and approve the company’s 
strategies. 
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For those companies which have no controlling shareholders the directors 
perform all activities usually related to the control function of the board; making 
decisions about hiring and firing of the CEO; making the decision about the CEO 
and directors compensation and discuss and approve the  company’s strategies. 
 
The Companies Act 2002 partially codified the common law duties of directors. 
These duties are to act in good faith and in the interest of the company and the 
duty of care. Under the duty of care, the court can use both objective and 
subjective tests. In the subjective test, the court looks at the skills and experiences 
of the directors whereas in an objective test it looks at how directors reach their 
decision. The objective test is just to test if a decision reached by a director would 
have been reached by another person in his capacity as a director.  
 
The guidelines recommended by CMSA recognise that directors have a fiduciary 
responsibility to shareholders. Directors are expected to perform a number of 
activities to protect and further the interests of shareholders. It further 
recommends that the interests of the company’s stakeholders should also be 
considered, especially in decision making. However, the interest of shareholders 
which is maximisation of wealth constitutes the key criterion in decision making. 
 
The CMSA guidelines recommended that, composition of the board of directors 
of listed companies should have at least one third of the board members as non-
executive directors. The Companies Act does not make any provision regarding 
the existence of non-executive directors in the management of the company.  
 
However, there is no provision regarding the separation of powers of the CEO 
and the chairman of the board. The statement below is the evidence to that effect: 
‘[T]he directors may appoint one member to be the chairman of the board of directors 
and determine the period of which he is to hold office. Unless he is unwilling to do so, 
the director so appointed shall preside at every meeting of directors at which he is 
present. But if no such chairman is appointed, or if he is unwilling to preside, or if at any 
meeting the chairman is not present within five minutes after the time appointed for 
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holding the same, the directors present may choose one of their number to be chairman 
of the meeting.’248 
 
Therefore based on the above provision, there is a possibility of having 
companies whereby the posts of board chairman and executive director are 
separated and there exist scenarios whereby the two posts are combined and 
occupied by one person. By virtue of his position as a director, the chairman 
participates in decisions that are aimed at controlling his decisions. This reduces 
the extent to which other directors can be critical of his decisions. The continuing 
existence of the above paragraph fetters the application of the CMSA guidelines 
which recommend the separation of powers between the two posts.
249
 This 
implies that the board leadership is not considered to have any impact in 
governance of the companies. Donaldson and Davies opined that corporate 
performance would be achieved through the greater independence in decision-
making that would be achieved by splitting the role of the CEO and the 
chairman.
250
 
 
4.3.2 Kenya  
 
Guidelines on corporate governance practices by public listed companies in 
Kenya provide that every public listed company should be headed by an effective 
board to offer strategic guidance, lead and control the company and be 
accountable to its shareholders.
251
 However, the board of directors shall exercise 
all the powers of the company subject only to the limitations contained in the law 
and the memorandum and articles of incorporation. This is because the system of 
ownership reflects that of South Africa which contains both companies which 
have concentrated ownership and dispersed ownership. Therefore, for the 
company with a controlling shareholder the MEMARTS may provide otherwise 
regarding the powers of directors in the company’s business. 
 
                                                          
248
 Paragraph 45 of the schedule to Act. 
249
 See para 3.2.1 of the CMSA. 
250
Donaldson L & Davies JH (1994) 2(3) 151. 
251
See the CMSA Guidelines at 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
The manner in which directors are to exercise their powers in managing the 
company was not dealt with by the Companies Act 1962 nor the new Act of 
2009, but by Table A of England's Companies Act 1948.
252
 It is worth pointing 
out that Table A is optional and may not be part of the constitution of the 
company. The provisions of Table A are therefore discussed with the general 
assumption that they will be applicable to Kenyan companies.
253
 Article 101 of 
Table A provides that, ‘the directors may elect a chairman to their meetings and 
determine the period for which he is to hold office.’ This contravenes the CMA 
guideline which requires every public listed company should as a matter of best 
practice separate the role of the chairman and chief executive in order to ensure a 
balance of power and authority and provide for checks and balances. 
Chairmanship of a public listed company should be held by an independent and 
non-executive director.
254
 
 
Although Table A is not mandatory, except where a company has adopted it into 
its constitution, the appointment of board chairman is likely to be based on it. 
When it is adopted by the company’s constitution, it becomes a mandatory 
legislation upon which directors of companies can challenge the 
recommendations of the CMA Guidelines which are not mandatory. Therefore, it 
suppresses Kenya's quest towards adopting good corporate governance. There is a 
need to review Article 101 of Table A accordingly to prevent it from suppressing 
compliance with the requirement that the chairmanship of a public listed 
company should be held by an independent and non-executive director. 
 
In Tanzania and Kenya strengthening managerial accountability may not be 
pressing because of the system of ownership and control which prevail. The 
system of management and control is referred to as insider or control oriented. 
The large companies listed in Tanzania and in many developing countries have 
concentrated shareholders who have a hand of control in the management. Hence 
the controlling shareholders can manage the company as they wish as they are the 
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ones who decide the mode of governance. However, the issue remains with the 
protection of minority shareholders. 
 
4.3.3 South Africa 
 
The King III Report recommended that the Board should act as the focal point for 
Corporate Governance.
255
 This means that the board should direct, govern and 
control the company. The Board should provide effective Corporate Governance. 
The Board should as the link between the stakeholders and the company, exercise 
leadership, enterprise, integrity and judgment. It is the duty of the Board also to 
identify and take account of the legitimate expectations of stakeholders. 
Stakeholders should be engaged in such a manner that they have trust and 
confidence in the company.  
 
Unlike the position in Tanzania where the interests of the controlling 
shareholders are well protected the ownership system applied in South Africa 
allows the directors to govern all the business of the company. This is because of 
the developments which have been achieved in South Africa whereby there is a 
separation of ownership and control in many listed companies. Therefore, in 
order to protect the majority shareholders, the management must be accountable.  
 
Though the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not directly contemplate a board 
with separate executive and non-executive structures, it expressly permits ex 
officio members who hold ‘some other office, title, designation or similar status 
with the company’.256 Furthermore the King III Report emphasised the unitary 
board structure
257
 whereby the board should consist of both executive directors 
and non-executive directors
258
who will interact. The separation of position of the 
CEO and the chairman of the board is also among the recommendation of the 
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King III Report.
259
 In addition to this the board should ensure that the company 
complies with all relevant laws, regulations and codes of business practices and 
communicate with its shareowners and relevant stakeholders.
260
 
 
The new Companies Act which came into force in 2011 does partially codify the 
director’s duties.261 The new Act having regarded the development of the 
companies in the country and the need for a strong corporate regime; it gives the 
broader definition of not only ex officio directors but also other officers and 
committee members. This was done purposely because the duties of directors 
applied also to other prescribed officers.
262
 The new Act does not provide for the 
qualification of directors. However, the Act provides for liability of directors, 
hence both subjective and objective test will be applied in determining whether 
they act with reasonable care and for the interest of the company.
263
  
 
Section 67(3) of the new Act provides for both a subjective and objective test in 
examining the duty of care of directors depending on what type of skill the 
person has. This sub-section resolves the problem of lack of certain list of 
qualifications required for a person to be appointed as a director as one test of 
degree of care and skills cannot fit all. 
 
Unlike the position in Tanzania and Kenya, the South African Companies Act 
2008 provides for a business judgement rule.
264
 The Companies Act, by 
recognising the risks associated with businesses, such as economic crisis, 
exchange rates, environmental changes and many other social and economic 
risks, it provides for a shield in the form of this rule which may be used by 
directors to escape liability.  
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A director who aims to rely on this defence should show that he acted in good 
faith and for a proper purpose; in the best interests of the company; and with the 
degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of a person 
carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those carried out by 
that director; and having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that 
director.
265
  
 
He is further required to satisfy that he has taken reasonably diligent steps to 
become informed about the matter; he had no material personal financial interest 
in the subject matter of the decision, and had no reasonable basis to know that 
any related person had a personal financial interest in the matter and he had a 
rational basis for believing, and did believe, that the decision he made or 
supported was in the best interests of the company.
266
 Hence the business 
judgement rule is the only way of protecting innocent directors otherwise people 
would be afraid to accept the position of directorship.  
 
4.4 SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHTS AND THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
In the modern economy, where there is separation of ownership from control, 
corporate governance is a balance in which shareholders limit their right to 
manage the company and leave it to the directors who provide for and oversee 
management of the company and owe duties and liabilities to the company and to 
the shareholders. The treatment of shareholders differs from country to country 
depending on the system of ownership in place. 
 
4.4.1 Tanzania 
 
As elaborated in earlier chapters the ownership system existing in Tanzania is 
dominated by the concentrated shareholder. The MEMARTS of incorporation is 
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the main internal rules of the company. In Tanzania, the law allows classes of 
shares to be issued hence there is variation of shareholder’s rights.267  
 
All shareholders have the right to participate in a general meeting. The 
Companies Act also gives the member the right to require an extraordinary 
meeting; however the member must own at least 10% of the shares in the 
company in the case of company limited with share and not less than one-tenth of 
the voting rights in the case of any other company at the time of requisition.
268
 
Special resolution can only be passed by the majority votes of at least 75% of the 
members who are entitled to vote. In those companies with concentration of 
shareholding, the controlling shareholders have a bigger chance to pass a 
resolution than is the case with minority shareholders.  
 
However, in order to protect minority interests any member of a company can 
make an application to the court for intervention or for permission to start a 
derivative action on behalf of the company if the affairs of the company are being 
conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the 
members in general or the minority in particular.
269
 In the system where 
controlling shareholders hold more than 60 per cent of the shares it will be 
difficult for minority shareholders to secure a resolution for derivative action 
especially where they are complaining about abuse by the controlling 
shareholders. 
 
4.4.2 Kenya  
 
In Kenya as the case in Tanzania the controlling shareholders are more protected 
than the minority in the companies with concentrated ownership. The CMA 
Guidelines deal with the extent of foreign ownership and provide that, ‘a board of 
a public listed company should ensure equitable terms of shareholders including 
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the minority and foreign shareholders’.270 This provision reiterates the fact that 
the interests of minority shareholders need to be taken into account. Other 
provisions in the CMA Guidelines however, contradict this end. At paragraph 
3.3(iv) it states that, ‘every shareholder shall have a right to participate and vote 
at the general shareholders meeting including the election of directors’. With 
foreign ownership in some companies exceeding 40 per cent, with a possibility of 
60 per cent ownership,
271
 it is doubtful whether minority shareholder votes will 
have any effect in securing the interests of minority shareholders. Research has 
shown that a majority of the top 20 companies listed in the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange are foreign controlled.
272
  
 
CMA recognizes the risk which might be faced by minority shareholders in 
protecting their interest in the company. Paragraph 3.1.2(iii) of the Guidelines 
states that: ‘The structure of the board should also provide a mechanism for 
representation of the minority shareholders without undermining the collective 
responsibility of the directors.’ 
 
In order to protect minority shareholders the CMA Guidelines require the structure of 
the board to reflect the Company’s shareholding structure. The board composition 
should not be biased towards representation by a substantial shareholder but should 
reflect the Company’s broad shareholding structure. The composition of the board 
should also provide a mechanism for representation of the minority shareholders 
without undermining the collective responsibility of the directors.
273
 Shareholder 
protection appears to only be possible if minority shareholders vote as a block.  
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Research in developed countries has shown that shareholders as a group have an 
incentive to monitor the actions of management.
274
 This highlights the need to 
protect the rights of minority shareholders in Kenya and Tanzania by reviewing the 
law affecting derivative actions to provide an efficient dispute resolution mechanism 
for minority shareholders. 
 
4.4.3 South Africa  
 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 is more robust in providing shareholder 
protection than the Companies Acts of Tanzania and Kenya. The Act provides 
greater power and more forceful means of intervention to shareholders than 
would be found in the United States or United Kingdom.
275
 
 
As in the case of Tanzania and Kenya, the Act provide for the right of the 
shareholder to participate in the annual general meeting. The Act goes further 
allowing shareholders to raise any matter at any time with or without advance 
notice to the company’. 276 
 
The Act also allows shareholder participation beyond the annual meeting. It does 
grant shareholders representing at least 10 per cent of the voting rights in a 
company the right to call a special meeting.
277
 
 
The Act also allows any two shareholders of a company to propose a resolution 
concerning any matter of which they are each entitled to exercise voting rights.
278
 
The scope of a permitted resolution is narrowed only in that it requires the 
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resolution to be clear and properly explained for the shareholders who have right 
to vote in the meeting to determine  whether to participate in a meeting and to 
seek  influence of the outcome of the vote on the resolution.
279
 Shareholders are 
also allowed to commence derivative proceedings.
280
 However, the resolution 
should be approved by the shareholders. The Act provides that for an ordinary 
resolution to be approved by shareholders, it must be supported by more than 
50% of the voting rights exercised on the resolution except for an ordinary 
resolution for the removal of a director under section 71. For a special resolution 
to be approved by shareholders, it must be supported by at least 75% of the 
voting rights exercised on the resolution.
 281
 
 
4.5 STAKEHOLDERS’ RIGHTS 
 
4.5.1 Tanzania and Kenya  
 
As pointed out in chapter 3, corporate governance in Tanzania is confined to the 
boundaries drawn by Anglo-Saxon notions of property rights- that is, it is a 
shareholder-oriented system. The transplanted company ordinance and the 
current Companies Act represent the way in which this Anglo-Saxon notion has 
been reproduced in the Tanzanian context and reflects the linked colonial past.  
 
Corporate governance that is focused on shareholder interests alone is 
increasingly being challenged. This is in particular on the basis of its narrow 
focus as well as its ethics or morality. Fort and Schipani
282
 assert that: ‘the 
comfortable and traditional characterization of corporations as profit maximisers 
within the limits of the law might be insufficient in today’s world’. While the 
shareholder perspective is being challenged, an alternative perspective - the 
                                                          
279
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communitarian perspective is increasingly receiving greater attention and is even 
being advocated by some as evidenced by the use of such words as ‘inclusive’ 
corporate governance.  
 
In Tanzania, as pointed out in Chapter 3, the legal framework encourages some 
limited form of stake holding orientation in the governance of corporations. 
Under the companies Act 2002 the directors are supposed to protect the interests 
of the shareholders first. In addition to the interests of the members, the directors 
of the company have to give regard to the interests of the company's employees 
in the performance of their functions.
283
 
 
Although the CMSA Guidelines recommend that the company should take into 
consideration the interest of other stakeholders; the implementation of it is 
fettered due to the lack of effective enforcement and lack of back up with legal 
rules. Also the CMSA Guidelines are essential for public companies in Tanzania 
in order to maximize shareholder value. The position in Kenya is not different 
from that of Tanzania. The Companies Acts are silent on protection of other 
stakeholders.  
 
In Kenya the CMA Guidelines has been developed as a response to the 
recognition of the role of good governance in “maximisation of shareholders 
value as well as protection of investors' rights”. The focus of the Guidelines 
appears to be on shareholders rather than stakeholder interests. This is confirmed 
by paragraph 3 of the CMA Guidelines, which provides that: 
‘… [T]he adoption of international standards in corporate governance best practice is 
essential for public companies in Kenya in order to maximize shareholders value ….’ 
 
As is the case in Tanzania, the corporate governance pursued in Kenya is 
shareholders oriented. The company should however take into consideration the 
interest of other stakeholders while pursuing shareholders’ welfare.284 
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4.5.2 South Africa  
 
South Africa has a robust legal system when it comes to the issue of 
stakeholder’s rights other than shareholders. The King Committee’s Report on 
corporate governance states in paragraph 37 that: 
‘… [I]t is the King committee’s unanimous view that the inclusive approach is 
fundamental to doing business in South Africa in order to ensure that companies succeed 
at balancing economic efficiency and society’s broader objectives.’ 
 
An inclusive approach to corporate governance implies a system of governance 
of corporations in which the interests of non-shareholder constituencies are 
seriously taken into account in the decision making processes of corporations. 
The King III Report recommended a triple bottom-line or integrated report.
285
 
 
The inclusive approach has however posed a tension on its practical 
implementation which was also recognised by the King Report. In paragraph 5.1 
of the report it is noted that: 
‘….. [T]he stakeholder concept of being accountable to all legitimate stakeholders must 
be rejected for this simple reason that to ask boards to be accountable to everyone would 
result in their being accountable to no one… .’ 
 
Under the Companies Act, shareholders, directors, officers or trade unions 
representing employees of the company may initiate proceedings to restrain the 
company from doing anything inconsistent with the new Act.
286
 Employees, 
through trade unions, are also provided the opportunity to have a director 
declared delinquent
287
 and are given the authority to institute a derivative action 
to recover for losses to the corporation, a power held only by shareholders of a 
company in most jurisdictions.
288
 In addition to the broadened power given to 
employees under the Companies Act, employees are also provided with more 
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expansive access to information than is typically provided to non-shareholder 
stakeholders. The South African Companies Act requires that trade unions be 
given access to company financial statements for the purpose of initiating a 
business rescue process.
289
 Additionally, like shareholders, trade unions must be 
notified if the board provides financial assistance to any director.
290
 
 
The new Act also provides that the Minister of Trade and Industry may require a 
social and ethics committee
291
 or other committees such as director’s nomination 
and remuneration committees. A committee may include non-director members, 
although those members may not vote on matters the committee decides.
292
 
 
4.6 ENFORCEMENT OF COMPLIANCE 
 
Tanzania, Kenya and South Africa have come up with a number of legal and 
regulatory provisions as a way of ensuring compliance with formalities and legal 
requirements.  Further, in order to make sure that directors conduct their duties 
within the ambit of good corporate governance they must comply with legal rules 
and regulations of corporate governance. Standards of directors' behaviour are 
enforced through both criminal and civil sanctions as charges against a director 
who misappropriates property can be brought under both civil and criminal law. 
To enforce a director's duty of loyalty and therefore secure their duty of care and 
skill, criminal sanctions are the key to providing the necessary standard of 
deterrence under which directors can be expected to refrain from 
misappropriation of company assets.  
 
                                                          
289Section 31 (3) provides that: ‘Trade unions must, through the Commission and under 
conditions as determined by the Commission, be given access to company financial statements for 
purposes of initiating a business rescue process’. 
290
 If the board provides financial assistance to a director or officer is must provide written notice 
to all shareholders and to any trade union representing its employees.’ See s 45(5). 
291
See s72(4). 
292
 See s72 (2)(a). 
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The South African Companies Act contains a wide range of purely criminal 
provisions.293 Directors’ liability is set out under the Act294 although in some cases 
ones liability is based entirely on his own conduct.295 Over and above this, the 
Companies Act provides for remedies in respect of common law.296 This means that 
the provisions of the common law can also be applied to a director or company for 
misconduct or any breach of the provisions of the Act.297 
 
However, an examination of Kenya's companies’ legislation reveals a 
comprehensive legal framework that is difficult to enforce owing to underlying 
weaknesses in the drafting of legislation governing director liability. Director’s 
liability is dealt with under s.45 of the Companies Act. Section 45(1)(a) of the 
Companies Act provides that directors are personally liable for misstatements in 
company prospectus but avails directors with an array of defences in s.45(2). 
Section 45(2) provides that where a prospectus has been issued without his 
consent, where he withdrew his consent or relied on a public official document, a 
director is exempted from liability for misstatements in the company prospectus. 
Section 45 of the Companies Act consequently gives company directors no 
incentive to ensure that they exercise due diligence in the performance of their 
duties.  
 
Shareholders are left vulnerable and unprotected by this provision, in that where a 
shareholder has relied on incorrect information in the company's prospectus, they 
can only be compensated if it can be shown that the director was aware of the 
misstatements in the prospectus or that the director consented to the issuing of the 
                                                          
293
 Section 216 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides that any director who is convicted of 
any offence referred to in the Act is liable to a fine and can be sentenced to a maximum period of 
ten years depending on the nature of the offence. 
294
 Section 77. 
295
For example s 216(5) of the Companies Act, which makes it a criminal offence for a director to 
fail to notify the company of a change in personal particulars. 
296
 In support of this view, section 158 of Act 71 of 2008 provides that -when determining a 
matter brought before it in terms of this Act, or making an order contemplated in this Act a court 
must develop the common law as necessary to improve the realization and enjoyment of rights 
established by this Act. 
297
 For example, subsection (2) of section 77 provides that the section applies in addition to any 
rule of common law that is consistent with the section.  
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prospectus.
298
  The burden of proof here rests with the shareholder, who usually 
has access to little or no information on the activities of the company. 
 
On the other hand, the Tanzania Companies Act provides for prohibition to the 
effect that the director can be held both civilly and criminally liable for 
misstatement in the offer document.
299
 The Companies Act Also provides for 
directors’ personal liability.300 
 
Under the Tanzania Companies Act
301
 the member can only bring action against 
the director in the company name. Unlike countries like the United States, where 
an attorney can bring proceedings on behalf of minority shareholders without the 
consent of the directors of the company,  in Kenya the decision to sue rests with 
the board of directors as it is only the board that can bring proceedings in the 
company's name.
302
 An advocate in Kenya cannot bring proceedings against a 
company on behalf of the shareholder without the authority of the board.
303
 The 
position in South Africa is more robust as the representative of employees can 
move the court in case of any fault done by the board.
304
 
 
The effectiveness of compliance is necessitated by the power given to 
enforcement organs. In all three countries courts are given certain powers with 
reference to corporate matters.
305
 In South Africa the new Companies Act 
provides the court with enormous power to override the corporate decision based 
on the ‘judges own judgment.’306  
 
The wide range of the enforcement mechanism also to some extent guarantees 
effective compliance. For example in South Africa as opposed to Tanzania and 
                                                          
298
 Section 46(1) of the Kenyan Companies Act 1962. 
299
 Section 50&51 of the Companies Act 12 of 2002. 
300
 Section 198-200.  
301
 Section 233,234.  
302
 Bugerere Coffee Growers Ltd v Sebaduka [1970] E.A. 147. 
303
 Bugerere Coffee Growers [1970]. 
304
 Section 162(2) of the Companies Act no. 71 of 2008. 
305
 In Tanzania for example court is empowered to give an order to convene annual general 
meeting, see section 134 of Companies Act 2002. 
306
See s71. 
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Kenya there are other bodies than the court which  are vested with powers to 
resolve corporate disputes. These bodies are: the alternative dispute resolution,
307
 
companies’ tribunal308 and filling complaints with the Takeover Panels in matters 
of change of control
309
 or with the companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission for any other matters
310
 as well as applying to Court.
311
 The Minister 
of Trade and Industry is empowered to interfere in the internal affairs of the 
company for the public interest.
312
 
 
4.7 CONCLUSION  
 
Some features appear to be common in all three countries’ legal framework. This 
is because of colonial history which has resulted in their corporate governance 
being based on the UK model in a common law framework. The corporate 
governance Code of South Africa and the guidelines of corporate governance of 
Tanzania and Kenya make similar recommendations in matters such as: 
separation of position of chairman and the CEO, having non-executive directors 
in the board and protection of shareholders’ interests. This is due to the 
international bodies which influenced these recommendations such as the 
OECD‘s principles. 
 
Another area of similarity is between Tanzania and South Africa whereby the two 
countries have amended their company legislation to codify directors’ duties313 a 
move that is being internationally recognised and that is aimed at clarifying and 
making the duties easily accessible and predictable. Furthermore, the DSE and 
                                                          
307
 See s166-167. 
308
 See s156 (b). 
309
See s168 (a). 
310
 See s168 (b). 
311
 Section 156 (c). 
312
 Section 72 (4). 
313
 The only different is that in South Africa the directors are provided by a shield of business 
Judgment rule while in Tanzania there is non-existence of such shield. 
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NSE have to incorporate the guidelines of corporate governance into their listing 
requirements as incorporated by the JSE
314
 in order to guarantee compliance. 
 
The analysis in paragraph 3.6 and 4.6 above has also revealed that the legal 
framework of corporate governance in South Africa is in a good position to 
guarantee compliances with both legal rules and voluntary mechanisms than in 
Kenya and Tanzania. The partial codification of directors duties in the 
Companies Act, the establishment and application of the code of corporate 
governance (King III); the incorporation of the King III in the JSE Listing Rules 
and the powers given to court and other enforcement machineries seem to 
facilitate compliance with the principles of good corporate governance in South 
Africa.  
 
Although all countries appear to be favouring more prescriptive rules and 
regulations, South Africa appears to promote self-regulation in corporate 
governance than in Tanzania and Kenya. This can be evidenced by the new Code 
of corporate governance which came into force in 2010 which apply to all type of 
companies. 
                                                          
314
 King III Report form part of the JSE listing rules hence all companies listed on JSE has to 
apply and in case failed to apply they have to explain the non-conformity. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The main purpose of this work was to establish the legal and regulatory 
framework of corporate governance in Tanzania. The key findings of this 
research are analogous to most of other developing countries.
315
 A number of 
corporate governance mechanisms have been identified such as the legal and 
regulatory framework, the ownership structure; control of  the board and powers 
of directors; shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ rights. A legal and regulatory 
framework for corporate governance in Tanzania does exist but further 
improvements are required. The most challenging issue facing Tanzania and most 
of the developing countries is the poor enforcement of the laws and 
regulations.
316
 
 
In order to attract investors and develop capital markets in Tanzania, there is a 
need to have a strong legal system that protects the interests of the minority 
shareholders. This is due to the fact that the spread of ownership and the 
separation of ownership from control do not currently exist in Tanzania as is the 
case in many developing countries. Therefore, the enforcement of the existing 
laws and regulations needs to be developed in order to encourage the 
development of capital markets which is of significant importance to Tanzania. 
 
Corporate governance in Tanzania currently reflects the legacy of the former 
policy of Ujamaa na Kujitegemea during which corporations were placed in the 
hands of the state. The same applied with the position where ownership is placed 
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 See the comparison with Kenya in chapter 4. 
316
 Chapter 3 and 4. 
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in the hands of controlling shareholders. Besides, the state is still a major 
shareholder in some companies, for instance 74.14% of Tanzania Oxygen 
Limited shares are owned by a single controlling shareholder which is the 
government.
317
 This gives the state the power to control management of these 
companies by appointing directors and other senior civil servants to such 
companies. This means that the decision making processes of government and 
those of some corporations are intertwined. 
 
The government is the one that develops and enforces laws; but through control 
of the companies done by its senior civil servants, it will be difficult for the 
government to regulate the behaviour of business in the economy. The fact that it 
is part of corporate decision-making processes, allows the possibility of senior 
civil servants being used to protect corporate interests by influencing the type and 
content of laws and regulations, and its enforcement mechanisms. 
 
The privatisation process which aimed at strategic investors resulted in the 
ownership of many of the privatised companies being under foreign control. This 
means that important decisions with implications for the Tanzanian economy are 
made abroad.
318
 This poses a serious challenge to the long-term development of 
Tanzania, and the realisation of the 2025 development vision. Tanzania is 
expected to achieve, by the year 2025, a number of goals ‘... Tanzania of 2025 
should be a nation imbued with five main attributes: high quality livelihood; 
peace, stability and unity; good governance; a well-educated and learning society; 
a competitive economy capable of generating sustainable growth’.319 The 
realisation of the goals contained in this vision depends on involvement of 
majority of the people (an inclusive approach) in the decision-making processes 
that are central to the allocation of resources in the economy. Yet, the corporate 
governance arrangement in Tanzania, which is exclusively shareholder-oriented, 
does not reflect the objectives of this vision. 
                                                          
317
 See chapter 3 para 3.3. 
318
 See chapter 3 and 4 for detailed discussion. 
319
United Republic of Tanzania (URT) Development Vision, 2025(1999). 5; President’s office, 
Planning and Privatisation Commission, Dar e s Salaam.  
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Since important decisions are made outside Tanzania, there is a possibility that 
corporations will be driven solely by business interests (as this is the primary 
reason why they invest in Tanzania) and have little interest in the welfare of 
Tanzania beyond the profits they can make. This calls into question the relevance 
of the received shareholder model currently being encouraged. There is an urgent 
need for a debate to reconcile these conflicting interests for the benefit of both the 
foreign capital that is required to stimulate the economy and for the long-term 
benefit of the Tanzanian economy. The need to address the interests of 
stakeholders in corporate governance other than shareholders is of utmost 
importance for the continued existence of corporations and society. 
 
5.2 CONCLUSION  
 
‘The proper governance of companies will become as crucial to the world 
economy as the proper governance of countries’320  
 
In light of the previous discussion and the weighted importance of corporate 
governance in today’s world; it is noted that a strong legal and regulatory system 
of governing companies is of utmost importance for the continued existence of 
corporations and attracting investors in a country. However, this does not mean 
that a good corporate regime in Tanzania is unattainable. In line with earlier 
submissions, it cannot be ignored that the present corporate governance regime in 
Tanzania poses a major threat to investors, both foreign and domestic, due to a 
lack of protection of minority shareholders.  This requires urgent attention from 
both the government and private sector.  
 
Importantly, it should be noted that, the developments in the eastern and southern 
Africa regions (the establishment of free trade areas in the EAC and in the 
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 As stated by James D. Wolfensohn, former President of the World Bank and quoted in 
Gatamah K (2004) 3. 
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SADC), with Tanzania as a member of both regional trade agreements pose a 
challenge for Tanzania to improve its corporate governance regime in order to 
benefit from the flow of investments from these regions. The EAC for instance 
aims at having a customs union, common market, monetary union and eventually 
political federation.
321
 
 
The need to have a good corporate governance regime has been established as 
essential for the country to attract investors. No potential investor will be ready to 
take the risk of investing capital in a country whose legal regime is not protecting 
his interests. The existence of both strong legal and voluntary rules is one of the 
important factors that any investor examines before investing in any country. 
 
Investors prefer larger as well as smaller markets as they enable them to take 
advantage of economies at various scale and scope. The increased size of the East 
African market that becomes available to entrepreneurs and multinational 
enterprises should provide excellent opportunities for investors to realize greater 
profits than they would in any of the smaller, single markets. Hence this is a 
challenge for countries in this region particularly for Tanzania to prepare a good 
foundation for these investors. Among the strategies is to have a good regime for 
corporate governance in order to attract FDI. 
 
5.2.1The Protection of Shareholders  
 
A large number of listed companies in Tanzania are owned by single large and 
controlling shareholders.  The existing legal system seems to protect these 
                                                          
321
 As stated under Article 5 (2) of the Treaty, ‘the Partner States undertake to establish among 
themselves and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, a Customs Union, a Common 
Market, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation in order to 
strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial, infrastructural, cultural, social, political and 
other relations of the Partner States to the end that there shall be accelerated, harmonious and 
balanced development and sustained expansion of economic activities, the benefit of which shall 
be equitably shared’. 
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shareholders.  It has been submitted that ‘large shareholders are the key 
determinant in the corporate governance in developing countries.’322 This 
proposition to a large extent has been confirmed in this research and corroborates 
the findings because the ownership structure in these corporations seems to give 
the controlling shareholders a possibility to influence corporate decisions.  
 
In situations where the ownership structure is under control of single large 
shareholders, there is a possibility of them having effective control in 
management hence posing a challenge with respect to the interests of minority 
shareholders. This creates a significant challenge as the controlling shareholders 
may use their position for their private benefits, i.e. benefits that are not available 
to other shareholders, and that has the consequence of reducing firm value. These 
large shareholders are thereby able to drain profits from the corporation to the 
detriment of minority shareholders.   
 
This work has shown that there is significant information and power asymmetries 
between controlling and minority shareholders in the Tanzanian context. In the 
current set-up in Tanzania, minority shareholders cannot effectively influence the 
decision-making process and they generally lack representation on the decision-
making boards of companies. In annual general meetings which they rely on for 
information on the performance of the corporations, the minority shareholders do 
not have an adequate voice.
323
 
 
Although this research has not found conclusive evidence that such expropriation 
problems currently do exist in Tanzania, it reveals that the existing situation is 
fertile ground for this to occur. Hence there is a need to put in place initiatives to 
improve corporate governance by protecting minority shareholders. 
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 Oman C, Fries S & Buiter W Corporate governance in developing, transition and emerging-
market economies (2003) OECD Development Centre, Policy Brief No.3. 
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 See Chapter 4. 
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In order to protect minority shareholders, Tanzania needs to develop a strong 
system as suggested by La Porta et al who identify six legal principles which they 
referred to as anti-director rights. These include:  allowing shareholders to mail 
their proxy vote to the firm; not requiring shareholders to deposit their shares 
prior to the general shareholders’ meeting; cumulative voting; proportional 
representation of minorities on the board of directors; and the presence of a 
mechanism for oppressed minorities. The other element is allowing shareholders 
with a low percentage of equity capital to convene an extraordinary shareholders’ 
meeting. The minimum shareholding should be less than or equal to ten per cent, 
and the pre-emptive rights of shareholders should be only waived by a 
shareholders’ vote.324 
 
The Tanzanian Companies Act 2002 also contains these anti director rights by 
allowing members of the company holding ten per cent (10%) of the paid up 
shares to require the directors of the company to convene an extra ordinary 
general meeting. Section 134 of the Act provides that: 
‘[T]he directors of the company notwithstanding anything in its articles, shall, on the 
requisition of members of the company holding at the date of the deposit of the 
requisition not less than one-tenth of such of the paid-up capital of the company as at the 
date of the deposit carries the right of voting at general meetings of the company or, in 
the case of a company not having a share capital, members of the company representing 
not less than one-tenth of the total voting rights of all the members having at the said 
date a right to vote at general meetings of the company, forthwith proceed duly to 
convene an extraordinary general meeting of the company’. 
 
The Act further provides that, if the directors failed to convene a meeting within 
twenty one days, the requisitionists or any of them representing more than one-
half of the voting rights may convene a meeting.
325
 The purpose of this provision 
is to protect the interest of all shareholders; however in the situation like 
Tanzania where in many companies a single shareholder holds more than fifty 
                                                          
324La Porta R et al ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (2000) Journal of Financial 
Economics 20. 
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 Section 134 (4). 
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per cent of the shares in a company, this provision can be easily abused and used 
to the detriment of the minority ones. 
 
The existence of this provision in the statute does not guarantee that it is 
enforceable. As mentioned earlier,
326
 the enforcement of laws and regulations is a 
key element of the sound foundations upon which effective corporate governance 
can be developed.  
 
5.2.2 The ownership structure 
 
The evidence from the study challenges the government's privatisation 
programme with respect to broadening ownership and the empowerment of 
Tanzanians. Privatisation through strategic investors leads to the emergence of 
large private shareholders who subsequently exclude large numbers of minority 
shareholders from important decision-making processes of corporations, 
including board deliberations, and this is contrary to the official objectives of the 
privatisation programme. However, large shareholders although effective in 
controlling incentive problems, also pose a challenge with respect to the interests 
of minority shareholders. This research found that a key corporate governance 
issue in Tanzania is the one of weak minority shareholders versus powerful 
controlling shareholders. 
 
The research found that the ownership structure of corporations in Tanzania is 
under few strong/large shareholders. The power of these large shareholders in 
corporate decision-making processes points to a practical challenge in the 
approach being pursued by CMSA in its recommendations.  
 
The recommendation of having independent non-executive directors does not 
work in corporations with concentrated ownership.  This reflects that these 
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guidelines were borrowed from developed countries where there is separation of 
ownership from control. This suggests that developing countries need guidelines 
which fit their social-economic environment and not just ‘transplanting’ from 
developed countries. There is a need to ensure that the law keeps up with the 
needs of society.  Lord Denning M.R. (as he then was) recognised this position in 
Nyali Ltd v A.G. of Kenya,
327
  where with reference to the common law he stated 
that one can take an oak tree from English soil and plant it on Kenyan soil, but 
one cannot guarantee that it will do equally well. He opined that: 
‘This wise provision should, I think, be liberally construed. It is recognition that the 
common law cannot be applied in a foreign land without considerable qualification… It 
has many principles of manifest justice and good sense which can be applied with 
advantages to people of every race and colour all the world over. But it also has many 
refinements, subtleties and technicalities which are not suited to other folk. These 
offshoots must be cut away. In these far off lands the people must have a law which they 
understand and which they will respect. The common law cannot fulfil this role except 
with considerable qualifications. The task of making these qualifications is entrusted to 
the judges of these lands. It is a great task. I trust that they will not fail therein.’ 
 
Although Lord Denning's quote refers to common law as opposed to legislation, 
it encapsulates the difficulties that arise when laws are transplanted from one 
jurisdiction to another without reviewing them to reflect the economic conditions 
and political environment of the receiving jurisdiction. Clearly, an effort has to be 
made to review Tanzanian corporate governance laws and guidelines to fit the 
needs of Tanzanians today.  
 
Requirements by international financial institutions, such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank that developing countries should implement 
structural adjustment programmes as a condition for awarding loans to 
developing countries have meant that developing countries like Tanzania and 
Kenya find themselves adopting a corporate governance system that is akin to the 
Anglo-American system of corporate governance. It is submitted that it is not 
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necessary to have one law which fits all; hence Tanzania should adopt a system 
which is compatible with its social-economic needs. 
 
5.2.3 The Board of Directors / Board Control 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, an effective board of directors is important in 
establishing effective corporate governance especially where single and large 
controlling shareholders do not address control aspects which are the domain of 
the board. It is submitted that when large shareholders become fully involved in 
control, boards of directors become mere advisory committees to management. 
The suggestion made by the Steering Committee on Corporate Governance and 
the CMSA on the separation of the chairman and CEO positions can be rendered 
futile due to the large shareholders who tend to render ineffective other corporate 
governance mechanisms.  With controlling shareholder powers upon the board, 
such separation does not necessarily lead to an effective board in the control role.  
 
Besides, the adherence to the principles of corporate governance that are being 
recommended in terms of board constitution, which are based on agency theory, 
does not necessarily lead to effective boards in the control function as would be 
expected.  For example, the suggestion of having a large number of independent 
non-executive directors in a board who are helpful in controlling the company’s 
businesses can only be attained in the absence of shareholders who closely 
monitor management. 
 
The recommendation given by the CMSA and Steering committee of having a 
majority number of independent non-executive directors in a board poses a 
challenge to the implementation of the guidelines. In the situation with the 
controlling shareholders, a considerable amount of effort is needed in 
implementing these recommendations as it can be resisted by the controlling 
shareholders. There are no criteria for appointing directors in Tanzania as they 
are directly appointed by the shareholders. The Companies Act does not provide 
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any qualifications for directors. This suggests that such appointments may not be 
based on clearly defined needs. This research suggests that there is a need for 
more clear and explicit criteria for appointing directors.  
 
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.3.1 Strengthening the legal and regulatory framework 
 
On the basis of the above conclusions, it has been argued that the foundations for 
the development of effective corporate governance are currently weak in 
Tanzania and are required to be developed and reinforced. The key issue appears 
to be the enforcement of the existing laws. The research recommends that in 
order to improve the enforcement of laws and regulations, the strategies such as 
training, sensitisation and awareness of the lawmakers, (Members of Parliament) 
and law enforcers (judges and managers of regulatory organs) with respect to 
issues of corporate governance should be established. This will enable Members 
of Parliament to realize issues involved in corporate governance and enhance the 
prospects of developing appropriate laws for Tanzania as well as the prospect that 
these laws will be enforced in practice. 
 
Tanzania needs to raise its corporate governance profile. There is little awareness 
of corporate governance issues in Tanzania. Media should be encouraged to 
report on corporate governance issues as it is the most effective way of raising 
people’s awareness of what is happening in corporations.  The current initiatives 
by the institute of directors of training directors cannot be undermined. However, 
a robust legal system plays a big role in corporate governance.  
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5.3.2  Protection of Minority Shareholders 
 
The ownership structure of many corporations in Tanzania is concentrated in few 
hands. Where a small number of block holders holds either majority or de facto 
control they can manipulate the management as they are in a position to place 
their representatives on the controlled firm’s board of directors hence rights of 
the minority shareholders are at risk. Tanzania needs to strengthen corporate 
governance to guarantee the protection of minority shareholders due to the fact 
that there is no separation of ownership from control. 
 
This issue emerged in the research and it has an effect on the flow of investment 
into the country. The protections of minority shareholders mostly require the 
enforcement of laws and regulations be improved. However, it also requires  
parallel implementation of other strategies including providing greater access to 
information, reviewing the current laws and regulations, educating of minority 
shareholders, organising shareholder associations and enforcing the existing 
recommendations and guidelines. 
 
As revealed by the research, there is unequal access of information between the 
controlling shareholders and minority ones. Greater access to information will 
enable minority shareholders to challenge the decisions of management and large 
shareholders hence prevent the possibility of diverting resources from the firm. 
This recommendation can be implemented by the CMSA through establishing 
institutions like stock brokerages, financial analysts and a reputable financial 
investigative press which will report the corporate issues and avail required 
information to the minority shareholders and community in general.  
 
The reviewing of existing laws and regulations is recommended in order to 
protect minority shareholders. The current requirement of holding at least ten per 
cent (10%) of voting equity to convene an extraordinary general meeting should 
be reconsidered because it appears prohibitive in a country such as Tanzania 
where majority of people are poor. It is recommended that a lower shareholding 
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threshold be introduced to increase the possibility of minority shareholders 
making use of this protection. 
 
Education of minority shareholders is also recommended in order to help them to 
know their rights. The CMSA and the Business Registration and Licensing 
Authority (BRELA) should encourage the companies to conduct seminars and 
educate minority shareholders about their rights. The shareholder associations 
can also do the same and also establish a body which will be lobbying for 
minority shareholders’ rights. 
 
Further, the implementation of the recommendation given by the CMSA and 
Steering Committee on corporate governance of separating the position of the 
chairman and the CEO will help to have an independent person managing 
company meetings. Such a person will endeavour to balance the interests of all 
shareholders away from the influence of the board. The CMSA have to 
incorporate this requirement into the DSE listing rules so that it will be 
mandatory for all listed companies. 
 
5.3.3 Reviewing the guidelines of corporate governance 
 
The evaluation of the current recommended guidelines has revealed that they do 
not address the existing corporate governance structure where there is imbalance 
of power that exists between the large and the minority shareholders. It is 
recommended that these guidelines be reviewed in the light of the findings of this 
research to address this important issue.  
 
The Institute of Corporate Governance (TICG) in collaboration with the CMSA 
and other corporate governance stakeholders such as academicians, private 
sector, Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Tanzania Investment Centre and 
lawyers should be involved in the review process and the CMSA should 
encourage the companies to implement them effectively. The CMSA should also 
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carry out periodic assessments to determine the extent the companies have 
complied with the guidelines. 
 
Tanzania also needs to have a corporate governance code which will act as a 
pillar of the corporate governance regime. There is a need to have this code as it 
is not possible to legislate on everything hence companies should be encouraged 
to adhere voluntarily to the corporate governance principles. Investors always 
look on a company’s profile to see whether it adheres to the corporate governance 
principles before they decide to invest in that company. 
  
This research compared the legal and regulatory system of corporate governance 
in Tanzania with that of South Africa and Kenya. The study doesn’t conclude that 
Tanzania should copy what is carried out in South Africa or Kenya but can use 
the South Africa corporate regime to evaluate the needs of the country with 
regard to corporate governance in order to meet socio economic needs. The King 
III Report of South Africa can be used as a reference in preparing a corporate 
governance code for Tanzania. Other international codes such as the OECD 
principles of corporate governance can be applied as a framework and would help 
to give further description and analysis of corporate governance in order to 
further understand the status of the various elements of this framework as applied 
to Tanzania. 
 
5.3.4 Other Stakeholders’ rights  
 
Tanzania should adopt a model that takes into account its cultural context and 
represents the interests of stakeholders such as the employees and community in 
general through representation on the board. There is strong debate globally 
concerning the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders.  As observed, 
the corporate regime in Tanzania is silent on the issue of other stakeholders. This 
research recommends that the review of the corporate governance guidelines and 
eventually establishment of corporate governance code should address this issue. 
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5.3.5 Board Control and Director’s Independence 
Director’s independence 
The director independence issue has been identified as a major problem in 
Tanzania. The ownership structure whereby controlling shareholders have power 
over the management is among the reasons for director’s independence not being 
given the weight it deserves. There is a need to develop director’s independence 
in the corporate governance regime of the country. In order to address this 
problem, this research supports the recommendations made by CMSA and the 
Steering Committee on Corporate Governance to be relevant and useful if 
companies could adhere to them.  
 
The two sets of recommended guidelines require directors to make proposals to 
shareholders about potential candidates who can be elected or rejected by 
shareholders. Directors should be recruited from the market by applying a 
transparent mechanism of inviting applications from the public. This issue can be 
addressed by boards of directors. 
 
Evaluation and Training of Directors 
For Tanzania to improve the effectiveness of boards which is also emphasised by 
the international community, this research recommends the introduction of 
director evaluations and feedback. Evaluations should be performed on the board 
as a whole, and on the individual directors and the CEO.  
 
Evaluation should reflect on the actual performance of the people being 
evaluated, and needs to be associated to the criteria for appointing directors. 
Boards of directors can implement this recommendation. The board of directors 
can be evaluated by reflecting on the decision making, adhering to corporate 
governance principles and the performance of the company. 
 
In conjunction with evaluating them, the orientation of new directors is of utmost 
importance as recommended by the CMSA and Steering Committee of corporate 
governance. Additionally, companies have to conduct training on work for 
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directors in order to bring them up to date on global corporate governance issues 
and improve their corporate governance practices. 
 
CMSA and BRELA should also encourage the directors to attend the training of 
directors which is currently offered by the Institute of Directors in order to equip 
themselves with the knowledge of running the business of the firm. It is 
recommended further that for a person to get directorship in a public company 
she/he should possess a certificate showing that he/she has attended the 
directorship course. 
 
The board structure 
The board structure of the company also plays a big role in the effectiveness of 
corporate governance of a firm. This research has identified that the position of 
the CEO and that of the chairman of the company is likely to be held by the same 
person. This is due to the fact that the Companies Act does not provide for its 
separation hence the companies may opt to separate it as recommend in the 
guidelines or refuse and rely on the Companies Act.
328
 It is recommended that 
companies should adopt a corporate structure which splits the position of CEO 
and chairman for effective and independent board as recommended by the CMSA 
and Steering Committee guidelines on Corporate Governance.  
 
A company's board of directors, in collaboration with its shareholders, can 
address this issue. Also, the legislature should amend the provision of Paragraph 
45 of the schedule to the Companies Act to make it compulsory that the CEO 
should not be the chairman of the board. This will remove the conflicting position 
currently existing between the Companies Act and the guidelines for corporate 
governance which legally allows the Companies Act position to prevail over the 
guidelines. 
                                                          
328
 Paragraph 45 of the schedule to the Companies Act No. 12 of 2012. For detailed discussion see 
chapter 4 para 4.2.1. 
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5.4 MATTERS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This study has employed a qualitative approach where findings are based on 
literature review only. The research highlights general issues which to a certain 
extent are valid for companies listed on the Dar es Salaam stock exchange. 
Further research should involve a quantitative practical survey, particularly with 
respect to listed and non-listed firms to provide a strong base for generalisation 
over a wide range of companies and give a firm practical test.  
 
The research can also be extended by practically surveying some companies’ 
practices in Tanzania and others from developed countries and then compare the 
findings. This will generate additional knowledge on the general development of 
corporate governance in developing countries.  Another area that requires further 
research is the accountability of the corporate business to society. The 
international community is emphasising corporate citizenship and corporate 
responsibility. The role that corporations play in the society they operate in is of 
utmost importance for their continued existence. Therefore the research in this 
area will provide insight into corporate governance practices and accountability 
in Tanzania. 
 
The role of stakeholders other than shareholders is not widely discussed in this 
research. This is an area for further research as the Companies Act of 2002 
introduces the notion of stakeholders to all companies by requiring directors to 
consider the interests of employees as one of their duties and to protect the 
employees in addition to shareholders. Despite this legal provision, employees 
are not represented on boards of directors. Research on the potential role of 
employees and other stakeholders in corporate governance will improve 
understanding of future corporate governance practices in Tanzania. 
 
Good corporate governance is required for all type of corporations. Therefore, it 
should not be limited to the industrial corporations and listed /public companies 
only. Research on other sectors of the economy such as the financial sector, the 
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public sector, private sectors and executive agencies is also needed. This is 
expected to provide additional insights on corporate governance practices in 
Tanzania.  
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